Please note - the lecture will be held as an online event.
The Zurich Center for Market Design is delighted to invite you to the Public Lecture held by Paul Milgrom, 2020 Economics Nobel Laureate.
Title: Linear pricing mechanisms without convexity
Date: 7 December 2021, 5 - 6 pm.
Location: To register for the Zoom Webinar, please click here!
About the Speaker
Paul Milgrom is the Ely Professor of Humanities and Sciences in the Department of Economics at Stanford University and co-founder of Auctionomics, which designs and advises bidders in high-stakes auctions, often involving billions of dollars. In 2020, Paul was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for “improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats.” His numerous additional academic awards, honors and citations are listed on his website.
We introduce the Bound Form First Welfare Theorem and two new linear pricing mechanisms leading to feasible, budget-balanced and approximately efficient outcomes even when Walrasian equilibrium does not exist. One mechanism permits different prices for buyers and sellers; the other uses a single price vector but permits some agents to be rationed. In these mechanisms, both the inefficiency-to-value ratio and the maximum benefit any single agent can gain from false reporting tend quickly to zero as the numbers of producers and consumers increase.