Financial Innovations, Money Demand, and the Welfare Cost of Inflation

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Abstract

In the 1990s, the empirical relation between money demand and interest rates began to fall apart. We analyze to what extent improved access to money markets can explain this break-down. For this purpose, we construct a microfounded monetary model with a money market, which provides insurance against liquidity shocks by offering short-term loans and by paying interest on money market deposits. We calibrate the model to U.S. data and find that improved access to money markets can explain the behavior of money demand very well. Furthermore, we show that, by allocating money more efficiently, better access to money markets decrease the welfare cost of inflation substantially.

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1 Introduction

The behavior of M1 money demand, defined to be the ratio of M1 to GDP, began to change substantially at the beginning of the 1990s. Up until the 1990s, money demand and nominal interest rates had remained in a stable negative relationship (see Figure 1). Since then, the empirical relation between M1 and the movements in interest rates began to fall apart and has not restored since (Lucas and Nicolini, 2013).

![Figure 1: M1 Money Demand in the United States](image)

In Figure 1 we plot the relationship between M1 money demand and the AAA interest rate in the U.S. from 1950 until 2010. The black curve displays this relationship from 1950 until 1989, while the blue curve displays it from 1990 until 2010. The green curve displays the relationship between M1 money demand adjusted for retail sweeps (M1S, hereafter) and the AAA interest rate in the period 1990-2010.

What accounts for this shift and the lower interest rate elasticity of money demand? It is well documented that changes in regulations in the 1980s and 1990s allowed for new financial products that affected the demand for money (Teles and Zhou, 2005). One

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1 We use the term financial innovation for two complementary scenarios: New financial products can originate from advances in information technology and science, or they can originate from changes in financial regulation. A case in point for advances in information technology is the sweep technology, which "essentially consists of software used by banks that automatically moves funds from checking accounts to MMDAs" (Lucas and Nicolini, 2013, p.5). A case in point for financial regulation is the Glass-Steagall prohibition of paying interest on commercial bank deposits, which was in force until 2011. Relaxation of this regulation in the 1980s and 1990s spurred a range of financial innovations; such as, money market deposit accounts in the 1980s or sweep accounts in the 1990s (see Teles and Zhou, 2005, and Lucas and Nicolini, 2013).
case in point are retail sweep accounts that were introduced in 1993. VanHoose and Humphrey (2001) report that the introduction of retail sweep accounts reduced required bank reserves by more than 70 percent between 1995 and 2000. Thus, the emergence of sweep accounts can be viewed as a prototypical technical innovation in the financial sector that might explain the downward shift of money demand. However, the green curve in Figure 1 shows that even when correcting for the impact of retail sweeps, there was still a substantial change in money demand in the early 1990s.

In order to explain the behavior of money demand, two complementary strategies are available. The first strategy is to construct a theoretical model and explore what changes in financial intermediation are needed to replicate the behavior of M1 as observed in the data, taking the definition of the monetary aggregate M1 as given. The second strategy is to redefine the monetary aggregate in order to better take into account what objects in an economy are used as transaction media of exchange. For example, if M1 is redefined to include sweep accounts, the changes in the money demand appear to be less dramatic (see Figure 1). A recent paper by Lucas and Nicolini (2013) follows this second strategy by carefully thinking about what objects serve as means of payment and need to be included into M1. They then define a new monetary aggregate called NewM1. This aggregate adds to the traditional components of M1, demand deposits and currency, the so called MMDAs. Finally, they show that there is a stable long-run relationship between the interest rate and NewM1. We will discuss their paper in more detail in Section 7.

Our paper follows the first strategy by taking the definition of money demand as given. We then construct a monetary model with a financial sector and investigate what changes in the financial sector can replicate the observed changes in money demand that started at the beginning of the 1990’s. From a theoretical point of view, innovations in financial markets can affect money demand via two channels. First, innovations may allow agents to earn a higher interest rate on their transaction balances. In doing so, such innovations make holding the existing money stock more attractive. Second, financial innovations may allocate the stock of money more efficiently.

In this paper, we argue that the second channel is responsible for the observed downward shift. In particular, we argue that the emergence of money market deposit accounts in the 1980s and the sweep technology in the 1990s is responsible for the observed changes in money demand. In our model, such innovations generate a shift in the theoretical money demand function similar to the one observed in the data. That is to say, they lower money demand and make the money demand curve less elastic.

We derive our results in a microfounded monetary model with a money market. In each period, agents face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks which generate an ex-post

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2 A MMDA (money market deposit account) is a checking account where the holder is only allowed to make a few withdrawals per month.
3 Throughout the paper, we work with M1S which is M1 adjusted for retail sweep accounts. Cynamon, Dutkowsky, and Jones (2006) show that the presence of commercial demand deposit sweep programs leads to an underreporting of transactions balances in M1. Detailed information on M1S is available in Cynamon, Dutkowsky, and Jones (2007).
4 The monetary model is the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework, and the money market is the same as the one introduced in Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007, BCW hereafter). Our theoretical contribution is that we consider a limited participation version of BCW.
inefficient allocation of the medium of exchange: some agents will hold cash but have no current need for it, while other agents will hold insufficient cash for their liquidity needs. In such an environment, a money market that reallocates cash to agents that need it improves the allocation and affects the shape of the money demand function. We study two versions of the model: one version with full commitment and another with limited commitment. Financial innovations are modeled as an exogenous shift in money market participation.

To study to what extent financial innovation can account for the observed behavior of money demand, we calibrate the model by using U.S. data from 1950-1989. In doing so, we assume that during this period no agent participates in the money market, where market participation is captured by the money market access probability $\pi$. We then perform the following experiments: First, a one-time increase in $\pi$ in 1990 from $\pi = 0$ to $\pi = 1$. In the experiment, we treat the case of full commitment and limited commitment separately, as they generate different predictions for the demand for money and the welfare cost of inflation. The experiment is conducted for three trading protocols: Nash bargaining, Kalai bargaining, and competitive pricing. These different pricing protocols generate different quantitative results, but the results are of an equal qualitative nature. In the second experiment, we search numerically for the value of $\pi$ that minimizes the squared error between the model-implied money demand and the data. We find that under competitive pricing a value of $\pi = 0.63$ replicates the observed shift in money demand best.

In Figure 2, we plot the observed money demand and the model-implied money demand under full commitment, by assuming an increase in the money market access from $\pi = 0$ to $\pi = 0.63$ in 1990. The model’s money demand, which is plotted against the interest rate, shifts downwards and becomes less elastic after the 1990s.
Furthermore, we also find that the welfare cost of inflation is considerably lower when we calculate it with our new theoretical money demand function as opposed to traditional models that do not take into account the recent changes in money demand. In fact, for any pricing protocol, we find that the welfare cost of inflation is at least 50 percent smaller now than it was in the period 1950-1989.

Finally, our paper also makes a theoretical contribution by introducing limited participation into BCW. As mentioned above, limited participation affects the money demand function in a interesting way.

Behavior of money demand The behavior of money demand is very well documented in Lucas and Nicolini (2013) and Teles and Zhou (2005) who also discuss the regulatory changes that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. We provide some additional discussion of these two papers in Section 7, but we also refer the reader to look at these papers for more information about money demand and regulatory changes.

Literature In the course of our research, we reviewed papers that study money demand and, in particular, those that explore the shift in money demand that occurred in the 1990s. They often involve Baumol-Tobin style inventory-theoretic models of money (e.g., Attanasio, Guiso and Jappelli, 2002, and Alvarenez and Lippi, 2009). In Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), agents face a cash-in-advance constraint, and money can be exchanged for other assets at a cost; two well-known extensions of the Baumol-Tobin model are Grossman...
Nicolini (2013), Ireland (2009), Teles and Zhou (2005) and Reynard (2004) are more recent attempts to explain the behavior of money demand. Papers that use the search approach to monetary economics are Faig and Jerez (2007), and Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2011). We discuss the above-mentioned papers in more detail in Section 7.

Another related branch of the literature are papers that study the welfare cost of inflation in monetary models with trading frictions; see, e.g., Lagos and Wright (2005), Aruoba, Rocheteau and Waller (2007), Craig and Rocheteau (2007), and Chiu and Molico (2010), among many others. Some other related papers study issues such as credit card use (Telyukova and Wright, 2008, and Rojas-Breu, 2013) and its effect on money demand (Telyukova, 2013), and the impact of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks on money demand over the business cycle (Telyukova and Visschers, 2012). The main focus of our work is to investigate the quantitative effects of financial innovation on steady state money demand and velocity.

2 Environment

There is a [0, 1] continuum of infinitely-lived agents. Time is discrete, and in each period there are three markets that open sequentially: a frictionless money market, where agents can borrow and deposit money; a goods market, where production and consumption of a specialized good take place; and a centralized market, where credit contracts are settled and a general good is produced and consumed. All goods are nonstorable, which means that they cannot be carried from one market to the next.

At the beginning of each period, agents receive two i.i.d. shocks: a preference shock and an entry shock. The preference shock determines whether an agent can consume or produce the specialized good in the goods market: with probability \( n \), he can produce but not consume, while with probability \( 1 - n \), he can consume but not produce. We refer to producers as sellers and to consumers as buyers. The entry shock determines whether an agent has access to a frictionless money market: with probability \( \pi \) he has access, while with probability \( 1 - \pi \) he does not. Agents who have access to the money market are called active, while agents who have no access are called passive.

In the goods market, buyers and sellers meet at random and bargain over the terms of trade. The matching process is described according to a reduced-form matching function, \( M(n, 1 - n) \), where \( M \) is the number of trade matches in a period. We assume that the matching function has constant returns to scale, and is continuous and increasing with


The literature on the welfare cost of inflation has been initiated by Bailey (1956) and Friedman (1969). Subsequent works include, but are not limited to, Fischer (1981), Lucas (1981), and Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1991). Most of these papers are cash-in-advance or money-in-the-utility-function models.

The basic environment is similar to BCW which builds on Lagos and Wright (2005). The Lagos and Wright framework is useful, because it allows us to introduce heterogeneity while still keeping the distribution of money holdings analytically tractable.
respect to each of its arguments. Let \( \delta (n) = \mathcal{M} (n, 1 - n) (1 - n)^{-1} \) be the probability that a buyer meets a seller, and \( \delta^s (n) = \delta (n) (1 - n)^{-1} \) be the probability that a seller meets a buyer. In what follows, we suppress the argument \( n \) and refer to \( \delta (n) \) and \( \delta^s (n) \) as \( \delta \) and \( \delta^s \), respectively.

In the goods market, a buyer receives utility \( u(q) \) from consuming \( q \) units of the specialized good, where \( u(q) \) satisfies \( u'(q) > 0, u''(q) < 0, u'(0) = +\infty \), and \( u'(\infty) = 0 \). A seller incurs a utility cost \( c(q) = q \) from producing \( q \) units. Furthermore, agents are anonymous and agents' actions are not publicly observed. These assumptions mean that an agent’s promise to pay in the future is not credible, and sellers require immediate compensation for their production. Therefore, a means of exchange is needed for transactions.\(^8\)

The general good can be produced and consumed by all agents and is traded in a frictionless, centralized market. Agents receive utility \( U(x) \) from consuming \( x \) units, where \( U'(x), -U''(x) > 0, U'(0) = \infty, \) and \( U'(\infty) = 0 \). They produce the general good with a linear technology, such that one unit of \( x \) is produced with one unit of labor, which generates one unit of disutility \( h \). This assumption eliminates the wealth effect, which makes the end-of-period distribution of money degenerate (see Lagos and Wright, 2005). Agents discount between, but not within, periods. Let \( \beta \in (0, 1) \) be the discount factor between two consecutive periods.

There exists an object, called money, that serves as a medium of exchange. It is perfectly storable and divisible, and has no intrinsic value. The supply of money evolves according to the law of motion \( M_{t+1} = \gamma M_t \), where \( \gamma \geq \beta \) denotes the gross growth rate of money and \( M_t \) the stock of money in \( t \). In the centralized market, each agent receives a lump-sum transfer \( T_t = M_{t+1} - M_t = (\gamma - 1)M_t \). To economize on notation, next-period variables are indexed by \( +1 \), and previous-period variables are indexed by \( -1 \).

The money market is modeled similar to the one in BCW. In the money market perfectly competitive financial intermediaries take deposits and make loans, which allows agents to adjust their money balances before entering the goods market. In particular, an agent with high liquidity needs can borrow money, while an agent with low liquidity needs can deposit money and earn interest. All credit contracts are one-period contracts and are redeemed in the centralized market. Financial intermediaries operate a record-keeping technology that keeps track of all agents’ past credit transactions at zero cost. Perfect competition among financial intermediaries in the money market implies that the deposit rate, \( i_d \), is equal to the loan rate, \( i_l \). Throughout the paper, the common nominal interest rate is denoted by \( i \).

BCW provide a detailed description of the environment that allows for the coexistence of fiat money and credit. We refer the reader to their paper for further details. In this paper, we generalize BCW by assuming that only a fraction, \( \pi \leq 1 \), of agents have access to the money market in each period. Like in BCW, we study two cases: full commitment and limited commitment. Under full commitment, there is no default. Under limited commitment, debt repayment is voluntary. The only punishment for those who default is

\(^8\)The role of anonymity in these models has been studied, for example, by Araujo (2004) and Aliprantis, Camera and Puzzello (2007).
permanent exclusion from the money market. For this punishment, we derive conditions such that debt repayment is voluntary.

3 Full commitment

In what follows, we present the agents' decision problems within a representative period, \( t \). We proceed backwards, moving from the last to the first market. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.

The centralized market. In the centralized market, agents can consume and produce the centralized market good \( x \). Furthermore, they receive money for their deposits plus interest payments. Additionally, they have to pay back their loans plus interest. An agent entering the centralized market with \( m \) units of money, \( \ell \) units of loans, and \( d \) units of deposits has the value function \( V_3(m, \ell, d) \). He solves the following decision problem

\[
V_3(m, \ell, d) = \max_{x, h, m+1} U(x) - h + \beta V_1(m+1),
\]

subject to the budget constraint

\[
x + \phi m + 1 = h + \phi m + \phi T + \phi (1 + i) d - \phi (1 + i) \ell,
\]

where \( h \) denotes hours worked and \( \phi \) denotes the price of money in terms of the general good. As in Lagos and Wright (2005), we show in the Appendix that the choice of \( m+1 \) is independent of \( m \). As a result, each agent exits the centralized market with the same amount of money, and, thus, the distribution of money holdings is degenerate at the beginning of a period.

The goods market. In the goods market, the terms of trade are described by the pair \((q, z)\), where \( q \) is the amount of goods produced by the seller and \( z \) is the amount of money exchanged. Here, we present the generalized Nash bargaining solution. In the Appendix, we also consider Kalai bargaining and competitive pricing. The Nash bargaining problem is given by

\[
(q, z) = \arg \max [u(q) - \phi z]^\theta (-q + \phi z)^{1-\theta} \quad s.t. \quad z \leq m.
\]

If the buyer's constraint is binding, the solution is given by \( z = m \) and

\[
\phi m = g(q) \equiv \frac{\theta u'(q) + (1 - \theta) u(q)}{\theta u'(q) + 1 - \theta}.
\]

If the buyer's constraint is not binding, then \( u'(q) = 1 \) or \( q = q^* \), and

\[
\phi = \frac{u'(q^*)}{q^*}.
\]

\( ^9 \)It is routine to show that the first-best quantities satisfy \( U'(x^*) = 1, u'(q^*) = 1, \) and \( h^* = x^* \).
The money market. At the beginning of each period, an agent learns his type; that is, whether he is a buyer or seller and his participation status in the money market (active or passive). Let $V^b_1(m)$ and $V^s_1(m)$ be the value functions of an active buyer and an active seller, respectively, in the money market. Accordingly, the value function of an agent at the beginning of each period is

$$V_1(m) = \pi \left[ (1-n) V^b_1(m) + n V^s_1(m) \right] + (1-\pi) \left[ (1-n) V^b_2(m) + n V^s_2(m) \right]. \tag{5}$$

An agent in the money market is an active buyer with probability $(1-n)$, an active seller with probability $\pi n$, a passive buyer with probability $(1-\pi)(1-n)$, and a passive seller with probability $(1-\pi)n$. Passive agents in the money market just wait for the goods market to open, so their utility function in the money market is equal to their utility function in the goods market.

An active buyer’s problem in the money market is

$$V^b_1(m) = \max_{\ell} V^b_2(m + \ell, \ell), \tag{6}$$

and an active seller’s problem in the money market is

$$V^s_1(m) = \max_{d} V^s_2(m - d, d) \quad s.t. \quad m - d \geq 0. \tag{7}$$

The constraint in (7) means that a seller cannot deposit more money than what he has. Let $\lambda_s$ be the Lagrange multiplier on this constraint. As we will see below, the nature of the equilibrium will depend on whether this constraint is binding or not.

In an economy with full commitment, there are two types of equilibria: an equilibrium where active sellers do not deposit all their money (i.e., $\lambda_s = 0$), and another equilibrium where active sellers deposit all their money (i.e., $\lambda_s > 0$). We refer to these equilibria as the type-A and type-B equilibrium, respectively.

3.1 Type-A equilibrium

In the type-A equilibrium, active sellers do not deposit all their money. For this to hold, sellers must be indifferent between depositing their money and not depositing it. This can be only the case if and only if $i = 0$.

**Proposition 1** With full commitment, a type-A equilibrium is a list $\{i, \hat{q}, q, \phi, \ell\}$ satisfying

$$g(\hat{q}) = g(q) + \phi, \tag{8}$$

$$i = \delta \left[ \frac{u'(\hat{q})}{g'(\hat{q})} - 1 \right], \tag{9}$$

$$i = 0, \tag{10}$$

$$\frac{\gamma - \beta}{\beta} = (1-\pi)(1-n) \delta \left[ \frac{u'(q)}{g'(q)} - 1 \right]. \tag{11}$$
According to Proposition 1, with full commitment in a type-A equilibrium, the following holds. From (8), the real amount of money an active buyer spends in the goods market, \( g(\tilde{q}) \), is equal to the real amount of money spent as a passive buyer, \( g(q) \), plus the real loan an active buyer gets from the bank, \( \phi \ell \). Equation (8) is derived from the active buyer’s budget constraint and immediately shows that in this equilibrium \( \tilde{q} > q \). An active buyer’s consumption satisfies equation (9), which is derived from the first-order condition for the choice of loans, \( \ell \). Equation (10) is derived from the seller’s deposit choice in the money market. In the proof of Proposition 1, we show that the first-order condition is \( \phi i = \lambda_s \), and since \( \lambda_s = 0 \), we have \( i = 0 \); together with (9), this implies \( u'(\tilde{q}) = g'(\tilde{q}) \). From (11), a passive buyer consumes an inefficiently low quantity of goods in the goods market unless \( \gamma = \beta \). This last equation is derived from the choice of money holdings in the centralized market.

As in BCW, to obtain the first-best allocation \( \tilde{q} = q = q^* \), the central bank needs to set \( \gamma = \beta \). Note further that as \( \pi \to 1, q \to 0 \). The reason for this is the following: if the chance that agents have no access is small, then the value of money is small as well. However, note that as \( \pi \to 1 \), the economy does not remain in the type-A equilibrium. Rather, it switches to the type-B equilibrium as explained below.

### 3.2 Type-B equilibrium

In the type-B equilibrium, active sellers deposit all their money at the bank, and so the deposit constraint is binding; i.e., \( \lambda_s > 0 \). For this to hold, the nominal interest rate must be strictly positive. In this case, we have:

**Proposition 2** With full commitment, a type-B equilibrium is a list \( \{i, \tilde{q}, q, \phi \ell\} \) satisfying

\[
\begin{align*}
g(\tilde{q}) &= g(q) + \phi \ell, \\
i &= \delta \left[ \frac{u'(\tilde{q})}{g'(\tilde{q})} - 1 \right], \\
g(q) &= (1 - n) g(\tilde{q}), \\
\frac{\gamma - \beta}{\beta} &= \pi \delta \left[ \frac{u'(\tilde{q})}{g'(\tilde{q})} - 1 \right] + (1 - \pi)(1 - n) \delta \left[ \frac{u'(q)}{g'(q)} - 1 \right].
\end{align*}
\]

Equations (12), (13), and (15) in Proposition 2, have the same meaning as their counterparts in Proposition 1. In contrast, equation (10) must be replaced by the market clearing condition in the money market (14).

Let \( \tilde{\gamma} \) be the value of \( \gamma \) such that equations (11) and (15) hold simultaneously; i.e., \( u'(\tilde{q}) = g'(\tilde{q}) \). Then, the following holds: (i) for any \( \beta < \gamma \leq \tilde{\gamma} \), then \( \lambda_s = 0 \); (ii) for any \( \gamma > \tilde{\gamma} \), then \( \lambda_s > 0 \).

### 3.3 Discussion

With full commitment and partial access to the money market, the quantity of goods consumed by active and passive buyers is represented by the two loci drawn in the right diagram in Figure 3. To draw this figure, we assume \( \theta = 1 \) and a linear cost function...
\[ c(q) = q. \] The dotted (solid) line denotes the consumed quantity by an active (passive) buyer as a function of \( \gamma \).

In the type-A equilibrium, an active buyer's consumption is independent of \( \gamma \) and equal to \( q^* \), while a passive buyer's consumption is decreasing in \( \gamma \) and smaller than \( q^* \) unless \( \beta = \gamma \). In the type-B equilibrium, both the active and passive buyers' consumption is decreasing in \( \gamma \). The dotted vertical line that separates the two equilibria intersects the horizontal axis at \( \gamma = \bar{\gamma} \). How does \( \bar{\gamma} \) change in the rate of participation \( \pi \)? Our numerical examples show that \( \bar{\gamma} \) is decreasing in \( \pi \) with \( \bar{\gamma} \to \beta \) as \( \pi \to 1 \). Hence, with full commitment and full participation, the type-A equilibrium exists under the Friedman rule only, while the type-B equilibrium exists for any \( \gamma > \beta \). The diagram on the left in Figure 3 shows the consumed quantities for the full participation case (i.e., \( \pi = 1 \)). In this case, all agents are active, and the first best consumption is achieved at the Friedman rule.

### 4 Limited commitment

In an economy with limited commitment, an active buyer decides whether to repay his debt or not. We assume that the only punishment available for an agent who does not repay his loan is permanent exclusion from the money market.\(^{11}\) As in BCW, this assumption generates an endogenous borrowing constraint which we will derive below.

A buyer who defaults on his loan faces a trade-off. On one hand, by not repaying, he benefits from not having to work in order to repay the loan and the interest on the loan in the current period. On the other hand, he will suffer from future losses, in terms of less consumption, since he will be denied access to credit forever. If the current benefit is smaller than the expected value of all future losses, a deviation is not profitable and the buyer repays his loan.

\(^{10}\)The shapes of the curves in Figure 3 do not change qualitatively for \( \theta < 1 \).

\(^{11}\)By the one-step deviation principle, we could exclude an agent by one period only and allow him to return to the financial sector provided he repays his past debt including accrued interest.
In what follows we label variables of a defaulting buyer with a tilde "\(\sim\)". In the following Lemma, we establish a condition such that active buyers repay their loan voluntary.

**Lemma 1** With limited commitment, a buyer repays his loan if and only if

\[
\phi \ell \leq \phi \tilde{\ell},
\]

where

\[
\phi \tilde{\ell} = \frac{(\gamma - \beta)[g(q) - g(q)]}{(1 + \tilde{\gamma})(1 - \beta)} + \beta \frac{(1 - \beta) \delta}{(1 + \tilde{\gamma})(1 - \beta)} \{\pi [u(q) - g(q)] + (1 - \pi) [u(q) - g(q)] - [u(q) - g(q)]\},
\]

and where \(\tilde{q}\) satisfies

\[
\frac{\gamma - \beta}{\beta} = (1 - \delta) \left[ \frac{u'(\tilde{q})}{g'(\tilde{q})} - 1 \right].
\]

The description of the centralized and goods markets is the same as in the full commitment case, and we omit it here. Unlike the full commitment case, in an economy with limited commitment, an active buyer’s maximization problem in the money market is subject to a borrowing limit as follows:

\[
V_{1b}^m(m) = \max_{\ell} V_{2b}^m(m + \ell, \ell) \text{ s.t. (16).}
\]

The borrowing constraint (16) means that the amount of real loan a buyer can get is bounded above by \(\phi \tilde{\ell}\). A bank refuses to lend more than \(\phi \tilde{\ell}\), since that would imply non-repayment. An active seller’s problem is the same as in the full commitment case, and it is characterized by (7). The value function of an agent at the beginning of each period is given by (5). Let \(\lambda_\Phi\) denote the Lagrange multiplier for the borrowing constraint (16).

With limited commitment, there are three types of equilibria: an equilibrium where active sellers do not deposit all their money (i.e., \(\lambda_s = 0\)) and the borrowing constraint is binding (i.e., \(\lambda_\Phi > 0\)); an equilibrium where active sellers deposit all their money (i.e., \(\lambda_s > 0\)) and the borrowing constraint is binding (i.e., \(\lambda_\Phi > 0\)); and an equilibrium where active sellers deposit all their money (i.e., \(\lambda_s > 0\)) and the borrowing constraint is non-binding (i.e., \(\lambda_\Phi = 0\)). We refer to these equilibria as type-0, type-I, type-II, respectively.

### 4.1 Type-0 equilibrium

In a type-0 equilibrium, active sellers do not deposit all their money (i.e., \(\lambda_s = 0\)) and the borrowing constraint is binding (i.e., \(\lambda_\Phi > 0\)). For this to hold, sellers must be indifferent between depositing their money and not depositing it. This can be the case if and only if \(i = 0\).

\[\text{In the Appendix, we also characterize an equilibrium, where active sellers do not deposit all their money (i.e., } \lambda_s = 0\text{) and the borrowing constraint is non-binding (i.e., } \lambda_\Phi = 0\text{). We refer this equilibrium as type-III equilibrium.}\]
Proposition 3 With limited commitment, a type-0 equilibrium is a list \( \{ i, \hat{q}, \check{q}, q, \phi \ell, \phi \overline{\ell} \} \) satisfying (17), (18), and

\[
\begin{align*}
g(\hat{q}) &= g(q) + \phi \ell, \quad \text{(20)} \\
\phi \ell &= \phi \overline{\ell}, \quad \text{(21)} \\
i &= 0, \quad \text{(22)} \\
\frac{\gamma - \beta}{\beta} &= (1 - n) \delta \left\{ \pi \left[ \frac{u'(\hat{q})}{g'(\hat{q})} - 1 \right] + (1 - \pi) \left[ \frac{u'(q)}{g'(q)} - 1 \right] \right\}, \quad \text{(23)}
\end{align*}
\]

The meaning of equations (20), (22), and (23) is identical to that of their counterparts in Propositions 1 and 2. Unlike the full commitment case, an active buyer is borrowing-constrained in the type-0 equilibrium. This immediately implies that the marginal value of borrowing is higher than its marginal cost. Hence, neither equation (9) nor (13) hold here. These equations are replaced by (21). Moreover, with limited commitment we also need to characterize the endogenous borrowing constraint and the consumption quantity of a defaulter as in equations (17) and (18), respectively.

The system of equations in Proposition 3 admits at least one solution which is the straightforward solution \( \hat{q} = q = \check{q} \). To see this, assume \( \hat{q} = q \). Then, from (20), it holds that \( \phi \ell = 0 \). Furthermore, (23) collapses to (18), implying \( \check{q} = \check{q} \). This means that the two terms on the right side of (17) are both zero, and, thus, \( \phi \overline{\ell} = 0 \). Therefore, we conclude that the above-mentioned quantities are equilibrium quantities.

However, we cannot show analytically that no other equilibrium exists. In fact, to the contrary, we identified, numerically, equilibria where \( q^* > \hat{q} > \check{q} > q \) and \( \phi \ell = \phi \overline{\ell} > 0 \).

4.2 Type-I equilibrium

In a type-I equilibrium, active sellers deposit all their money (i.e., \( \lambda_s > 0 \)), and the borrowing constraint is binding (i.e., \( \lambda_\phi > 0 \)). In a type-I equilibrium, we have

Proposition 4 With limited commitment, a type-I equilibrium is a list \( \{ i, \hat{q}, \check{q}, q, \phi \ell, \phi \overline{\ell} \} \) satisfying (17), (18), and

\[
\begin{align*}
g(\hat{q}) &= g(q) + \phi \ell, \quad \text{(24)} \\
\phi \ell &= \phi \overline{\ell}, \quad \text{(25)} \\
g(q) &= (1 - n) g(\check{q}), \quad \text{(26)} \\
\frac{\gamma - \beta}{\beta} &= \pi \left\{ (1 - n) \delta \left[ \frac{u'(\check{q})}{g'(\check{q})} - 1 \right] + ni \right\} + (1 - \pi) (1 - n) \delta \left[ \frac{u'(q)}{g'(q)} - 1 \right]. \quad \text{(27)}
\end{align*}
\]

All the equations in Proposition 4 have the same meaning as their counterparts in Proposition 3, except that (22) is now replaced by (26) which comes from the money market clearing condition. Equation (26) does not appear in Proposition 3, since sellers do not deposit all their money in a type-0 equilibrium, while they do it in a type-I equilibrium.
4.3 Type-II equilibrium

In a type-II equilibrium, active sellers deposit all their money (i.e., $s > 0$), and the buyer’s borrowing constraint is non-binding (i.e., $\lambda_\Phi = 0$).

**Proposition 5** With limited commitment, a type-II equilibrium is a list $\{i, \bar{q}, \bar{q}, q, \phi, \phi\}$ satisfying (17), (18), and

\[
\begin{align*}
g(\bar{q}) &= g(q) + \phi, \\
i &= \delta \left[ \frac{u'(\bar{q})}{g'(\bar{q})} - 1 \right], \\
g(q) &= (1 - n) g(\bar{q}), \\
\gamma - \frac{\beta}{\beta} &= \pi \delta \left[ \frac{u'(\bar{q})}{g'(\bar{q})} - 1 \right] + (1 - \pi) (1 - n) \delta \left[ \frac{u'(q)}{g'(q)} - 1 \right].
\end{align*}
\]

All the equations in Proposition 5 have the same meaning as the respective equations in Proposition 4, except that (25) is now replaced by (29). The meaning of equation (29) is the following. In a type-II equilibrium, active buyers are not borrowing-constrained, which means that they borrow up to the point where the marginal cost of borrowing an additional unit of money (left side) is equal to the marginal benefit (right side). Note that $\delta \left[ \frac{u'(\bar{q})}{g'(\bar{q})} - 1 \right] > i$ in type-0 and type-I equilibria, since buyers are borrowing-constrained, and so they cannot borrow the optimal amount of money.

Finally, notice that (28)-(31) are identical to the respective equations in Proposition 2. This is not surprising, since active buyers are not borrowing-constrained in a type-II equilibrium. Hence, in this region, the perfect and limited commitment economies implement the same allocation.

4.4 Sequence of equilibria

Let $\gamma_1$ be the value of $\gamma$ that separates type-0 and type-I equilibria, and $\gamma_2$ be the value of $\gamma$ that separates type-I and type-II equilibria. This can then be rendered in a sequence of equilibria which are summarized in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equilibria</th>
<th>$\gamma$</th>
<th>$\lambda_\Phi$</th>
<th>$\lambda_s$</th>
<th>Real borrowing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>type-0</td>
<td>$\beta &lt; \gamma &lt; \gamma_1$</td>
<td>$\lambda_\Phi &gt; 0$</td>
<td>$\lambda_s = 0$</td>
<td>$\phi \ell = \phi \bar{\ell} \geq 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type-I</td>
<td>$\gamma_1 &lt; \gamma &lt; \gamma_2$</td>
<td>$\lambda_\Phi &gt; 0$</td>
<td>$\lambda_s &gt; 0$</td>
<td>$\phi \ell = \phi \bar{\ell}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type-II</td>
<td>$\gamma &gt; \gamma_2$</td>
<td>$\lambda_\Phi = 0$</td>
<td>$\lambda_s &gt; 0$</td>
<td>$\phi \ell &lt; \phi \bar{\ell}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a*Table 1 displays the sequence of equilibria. For low values of $\gamma$, the constraint on depositors is not binding and so the nominal interest rate is zero. Nevertheless, the borrowing constraint is binding. For intermediate values of $\gamma$, both constraints are binding, and for high values of $\gamma$ only the constraint on deposits is binding.

The critical values of $\gamma$ are derived as follows: $\gamma_1$ is the value of $\gamma$ that solves $i = 0$ in the type-I equilibrium, while $\gamma_2$ is the value of $\gamma$ that solves $i = \delta \left[ \frac{u'(\bar{q})}{g'(\bar{q})} - 1 \right]$ in the type-I equilibrium.
The region $\beta < \gamma \leq \gamma_1$ can be further divided into two subregions. In the first subregion, there is an equilibrium with $\phi \ell > 0$ and $q^* > \tilde{q} > \bar{q} > q$ if $0 < \pi < 1$. In the second subregion, there is a unique equilibrium which satisfies $\phi \ell = 0$ and $\tilde{q} = \bar{q} = q$. To distinguish these regions, we numerically find a third threshold, $\gamma_0$, such that if $\gamma_0 < \gamma \leq \gamma_1$, the economy is in the first subregion, and if $\beta < \gamma < \gamma_0$, it is in the second subregion.

4.5 Discussion

With limited commitment and partial access to the money market, the quantity of goods consumed by active and passive buyers is represented by the two loci drawn in the right diagram in Figure 4. To draw this figure, we assume $\theta = 1$ and a linear cost function $c(q) = q$. The three lines denote the quantity consumed by an active buyer, $\tilde{q}$, a passive buyer, $q$, and a deviator, $\bar{q}$, as a function of $\gamma$. Note that the quantity consumed by a deviator equals the quantity consumed in a model with $\pi = 0$.

![Figure 4: Consumed quantities under limited commitment](image)

The diagram on the left of Figure 4 displays the consumed quantities for the full participation case (i.e., $\pi = 1$). As in BCW, there are three regions: If $\gamma < \gamma_0 = \gamma_1$, the borrowing constraint is binding with $\phi \ell = 0$. The reason is that money is highly valued, and so the value of participation in the money market is small. As a consequence, no agent pays back his loan. Hence, the allocation is the same as the one that would be obtained in the absence of a money market; i.e.; $\tilde{q} = \bar{q}$. If $\gamma_0 = \gamma_1 < \gamma < \gamma_2$, the borrowing constraint is binding with $\phi \ell > 0$. Furthermore, $\phi \ell$ is increasing in $\gamma$. Consequently, $\tilde{q} > \bar{q}$ and $\tilde{q}$ is increasing in $\gamma$, since the borrowing constraint is relaxed when $\gamma$ is sufficiently high. Finally, if $\gamma > \gamma_2$, the borrowing constraint is non-binding. Here, $\tilde{q} > \bar{q}$ and both quantities are decreasing in $\gamma$ due to the standard inflation-tax argument.

The diagram on the right of Figure 4 displays the quantities consumed for the limited participation case (i.e., $\pi < 1$). For $\gamma < \gamma_0$, the type-0 equilibrium exists, where financial intermediation shuts down, since $\phi \ell = \phi \bar{\ell} = 0$. Accordingly, the quantity consumed by
active and passive agents equals the quantity consumed by a deviator and is decreasing in \( \gamma \). For \( \gamma_0 < \gamma < \gamma_1 \), the type-0 equilibrium exists, where borrowing is constrained with \( \phi \ell = \phi \ell > 0 \), and the consumption of active agents is increasing and the consumption of passive agents is decreasing in \( \gamma \). For \( \gamma_1 < \gamma < \gamma_2 \), the type-I equilibrium exists, where borrowing is constrained and the consumption of active and passive agents is increasing in \( \gamma \). For \( \gamma > \gamma_2 \), the type-II equilibrium exists, where borrowing is unconstrained and the consumption of active and passive agents is decreasing in \( \gamma \).

The separation of these regions is indicated by the vertical dotted lines labeled \( \gamma_0 \), \( \gamma_1 \) and \( \gamma_2 \), respectively. Our numerical examples show that the critical values, \( \gamma_1 \) and \( \gamma_2 \), are decreasing in the rate of participation, \( \pi \), with \( \gamma_1 \to 1 \) as \( \pi \to 1 \). This is because a lower value of \( \pi \) reduces the chance of having access to the money market and thus increases the incentive to default.

We now show how the velocity of money behaves under limited commitment. The model’s velocity of money is derived as follows: The real output in the goods market is \( Y_{GM} = (1 - n) \delta [\pi \phi \dot{m} + (1 - \pi) \phi \dot{m}] \), where \( \phi \dot{m} = g(\dot{q}) \) and \( \phi M_{-1} = \phi m = g(q) \), and the real output in the centralized market is \( Y_{CM} = A \) for \( U(x) = A \log(x) \). Accordingly, the total real output of the economy is \( Y = Y_{GM} + Y_{CM} \), and the model-implied velocity of money is

\[
v = \frac{Y}{\phi M_{-1}} = \frac{A + (1 - n) \delta [\pi g(\dot{q}) + (1 - \pi) g(q)]}{g(q)}.
\]

According to the quantity theory of money, money demand is the reciprocal of the velocity of money. In Figure 5, we show how money demand and the borrowed amount behave in the four regions for \( 0 < \pi < 1 \).

![Figure 5: Money demand and borrowing constraint](image-url)

For \( \beta < \gamma < \gamma_0 \), the demand for money equals the one obtained in the model with \( \pi = 0 \). For \( \gamma_0 < \gamma < \gamma_1 \), borrowing is constrained and the quantity consumed is decreasing in \( \gamma \), hence the demand for money also declines. For \( \gamma_1 < \gamma < \gamma_2 \), borrowing is constrained, and the consumed quantity of active and passive agents is increasing in \( \gamma \). Thus, money demand is increasing in this region. For \( \gamma > \gamma_2 \), borrowing is unconstrained, and the quantities consumed by active and passive agents are decreasing in \( \gamma \). Therefore, money demand is declining for \( \gamma > \gamma_2 \).
5 Quantitative analysis

We choose a model period of one year. The functions $u(q)$, $U(x)$, and $c(q)$ have the forms $u(q) = q^{1-\alpha}/(1-\alpha)$, $U(x) = A \log(x)$, and $c(q) = q$, respectively. Regarding the matching function, we follow Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) and choose $M(B, S) = BS/(B + S)$, where $B = 1 - n$ is the measure of buyers, and $S = n$ is the measure of sellers. Therefore, the matching probability of a buyer in the goods market is equal to $\delta = M(1 - n, n) * (1 - n)^{-1} = n$.

The parameters to be identified are the following: (i) the preference parameters $\beta$, $A$, and $\alpha$; (ii) the technology parameters $n$ and $\pi$; (iii) the bargaining weight $\theta$; and (iv) the policy parameter $i$. To identify these parameters, we use quarterly U.S. data from the first quarter of 1950 to the fourth quarter of 1989. All data sources are provided in the Appendix. Table 2 reports the identification restrictions and the identified values of the parameters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Target description</th>
<th>Target value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>average real interest rate $r$</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$i$</td>
<td>average AAA yield</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>average velocity of money</td>
<td>5.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>retail sector markup</td>
<td>0.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>elasticity of money demand</td>
<td>-0.619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The nominal interest rate, $i = (\gamma - \beta)/\beta - 1 = 0.070$, matches the average yield on AAA corporate bonds. We set $\beta = (1 + r)^{-1} = 0.957$ so that the real interest rate in the model matches that in the data, $r = 0.045$, measured as the difference between the AAA corporate bonds yield and the change in the consumer price index. In order to maximize the number of matches, we set $n = 0.5$.

The parameters $A$, $\alpha$, and $\theta$ are obtained by matching the following targets simultaneously. First, we set $A$ to match the average velocity of money. Second, we set $\alpha$ such that the model reproduces $\xi = -0.619$, where $\xi$ denotes the elasticity of money demand with respect to the AAA corporate bond yield. Third, we set $\theta$ to match a goods market markup of $\mu = 0.30$, which represents an average value used in related studies.\(^{13}\)

Our targets discussed above, and summarized in Table 2, are sufficient to calibrate all but one parameter: the access probability to the money market $\pi$. Several studies argue that, after 1990, the money demand function shifted downwards due to the improved liquidity provision by financial intermediaries and that therefore, monetary policy has become less effective on real variables.\(^{14}\) For this purpose, we calibrate the above-specified parameters for the period 1950-1989 under the assumption that $\pi = 0$. Then, we assume that preferences remain constant and that in 1990 there was an increase in

\(^{13}\)Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2011) and Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2011), also use an average markup of 30 percent. This is the value estimated by Faig and Jerez (2005) for the United States. See also Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) for an estimated markup of 32 percent.

\(^{14}\)See Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2011) and the studies referred to in their paper.
This allows us to estimate to what extent financial intermediation can account for the observed shift in money demand.

Table 3 presents the calibration results for Nash bargaining, Kalai bargaining, and competitive pricing. Under Kalai bargaining, \( g(q) \) in (4) is replaced by \( g^K(q) = \theta q + (1 - \theta) u(q) \). For competitive pricing, we set \( \theta = 1 \).

### Table 3: Baseline Calibration from 1950 to 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nash Bargaining</th>
<th>Kalai Bargaining</th>
<th>Comp. Pricing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \pi = 0 )</td>
<td>2.078</td>
<td>2.554</td>
<td>2.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha )</td>
<td>0.388</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>0.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \theta )</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>0.760</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( 1 - \Delta )</td>
<td>2.02%</td>
<td>1.69%</td>
<td>1.27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 displays the calibrated values for the key parameters \( A, \alpha \) and \( \theta \) for \( \pi = 0 \). Table 3 also displays the welfare cost of inflation, \( 1 - \Delta \), which is the percentage of total consumption that agents would be willing to give up in order to be in a steady state with a nominal interest rate of 3 percent instead of 13 percent.

Table 3 also displays the welfare cost of inflation, \( 1 - \Delta \), which is the percentage of total consumption agents would be willing to give up in order to be in a steady state with a nominal interest rate of 3 percent instead of 13 percent. Under competitive pricing, the welfare cost of inflation is roughly 1.27 percent, which is in line with the estimates in Craig and Rocheteau (2008), and Rocheteau and Wright (2005, 2009). For the other trading mechanisms, the welfare cost of inflation is higher due to the holdup problem under bargaining. In particular, we obtain the highest estimate under Nash bargaining, with a number equal to 2.02 percent of the steady state level of total consumption. In all cases, the goods-market share of total output, \( s_{GM} \), is equal to 4.9 percent, which is in line with the estimates in Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2011), and Lagos and Wright (2005).

### 5.1 Full commitment - One-time increase in \( \pi \) in 1990

We now investigate the extent to which the improved liquidity provision in the 1990’s accounts for the observed behavior of money demand. For this, we consider how a one-time increase in \( \pi \) in 1990 affects the money demand and the welfare cost of inflation. We assume that in 1990 the entry probability to the money market increased from \( \pi = 0 \) to \( \pi = 1 \), while keeping all other parameters at their calibrated values. Then, we feed in the actual path of the nominal interest rate to simulate the model. This allows us to calculate the model-implied money demand properties and the welfare cost of inflation for the period from the first quarter of 1990 to the fourth quarter of 2010. The simulation results are provided in Table 4 below.

---

\[15\] The markup-target is only used for the calibrations under Nash bargaining and Kalai bargaining.

\[16\] This is the same measure adopted by Craig and Rocheteau (2008).
Table 4: Full commitment - simulation results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nash Bargaining</th>
<th>Kalai Bargaining</th>
<th>Comp. Pricing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-2010 Velocity</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>7.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[1 - \Delta_{FC}\] = 1.07% (2.02%) 0.71% (1.69%) 0.55% (1.27%)

Table 4 displays the simulation results of the velocity of money and the elasticity of money demand with respect to the AAA interest rate after a one-time increase in the access probability to the money market from \(\pi = 0\) to \(\pi = 1\) in 1990. Table 4 also displays the welfare cost of inflation under full commitment, \(1 - \Delta_{FC}\).

Table 4 shows that the increase in the access probability to the money market results in a substantial reduction in the welfare cost of inflation. For example, under competitive pricing, the welfare cost of inflation decreases from 1.27 percent to 0.55 percent. Furthermore, the model proves competent in replicating the higher velocity of money and the lower elasticity of money demand with respect to the AAA interest rate. An increase from \(\pi = 0\) to \(\pi = 1\) reduces the elasticity of money demand from -0.62 to -0.36 under competitive pricing. To illustrate the implications of the model, we show the simulated money demand under competitive pricing in Figure 6.

Figure 6 shows that the model works well in replicating the lower and less elastic money demand that occurred in the 1990s by increasing the access probability from \(\pi = 0\) to
5.2 Limited commitment - One-time increase in $\pi$ in 1990

As discussed in the theoretical section of this paper, full commitment and limited commitment generate different predictions for the demand for money and the welfare cost of inflation. We now repeat the exercise performed in 5.1 to gain the respective estimations for limited commitment and show the simulation results in Table 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Nash Bargaining</th>
<th>Kalai Bargaining</th>
<th>Comp. Pricing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-2010</td>
<td>π = 1</td>
<td>π = 1</td>
<td>π = 1</td>
<td>π = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velocity</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>7.04</td>
<td>7.13</td>
<td>7.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1 - \Delta_{LC}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.78% (2.02%)</td>
<td>0.55% (1.69%)</td>
<td>0.43% (1.27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$i_1$</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.45%</td>
<td>4.45%</td>
<td>4.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$i_2$</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.51%</td>
<td>5.45%</td>
<td>5.64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 displays the simulation results of the velocity of money and the elasticity of money demand with respect to the AAA interest rate after a one-time increase in the access probability to the money market from $\pi = 0$ to $\pi = 1$ in 1990. Table 5 also displays the welfare cost of inflation under limited commitment, $1 - \Delta_{LC}$. The table also shows the critical interest rate, $i_1$, that separates the type-0 equilibrium from the type-I equilibrium and the critical interest rate $i_2$ that separates the type-I equilibrium from the type-II equilibrium.

A comparison of Tables 4 and 5 shows that the elasticity of money demand and the welfare cost of inflation are lower under limited commitment than under full commitment. For example, under competitive pricing, the elasticity of money demand reduces to -0.29 after a one-time increase in $\pi$, while under full commitment, it reduces to -0.36. Furthermore, we obtain a welfare cost of inflation of 0.43 percent, while under full commitment we obtain a value of 0.55 percent. The simulation results of the money demand properties under competitive pricing are shown in Figure 7 (where LC stands for limited commitment and FC for full commitment).
As already stated, the elasticity of money demand and the welfare cost of inflation are lower under limited commitment than under full commitment. Table 5 provides the critical nominal interest rate that separates the type-I equilibrium from the type-II equilibrium. For all presented trading mechanisms, we find that \( i_2 \) is close to 5.5 percent, which means that for \( 1/\beta - 1 = i_1 < i < i_2 \), the type-I equilibrium exists, where consumption, and hence money demand, is increasing in \( i \).

### 5.3 Full commitment - Optimal increase in \( \pi \) in 1990

A one-time increase in \( \pi \) from \( \pi = 0 \) to \( \pi = 1 \) results in a model-implied money demand which is too low compared to the data. We therefore need to identify the value of \( \pi \) that best fits the data. For this purpose, we search numerically for the value of \( \pi \) that minimizes the squared error between the model-implied money demand and the data. As before, we assume that there was one-time increase in \( \pi \) in 1990, while keeping all other parameters at their calibrated values. The simulation results are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Full commitment - optimal market access

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data 1990-2010</th>
<th>Nash Bargaining $\pi = 0.66$</th>
<th>Kalai Bargaining $\pi = 0.61$</th>
<th>Comp. Pricing $\pi = 0.63$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Velocity</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>6.41</td>
<td>6.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1 - \Delta_{FC}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.25% (2.02%)</td>
<td>0.92% (1.69%)</td>
<td>0.70% (1.27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tilde{\iota}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.92%</td>
<td>2.42%</td>
<td>2.21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 6 displays the simulation results of the velocity of money and the elasticity of money demand with respect to the AAA interest rate after a one-time increase in the access probability to the money market from $\pi = 0$ to the optimal value of $\pi$ in 1990. Table 6 also displays the welfare cost of inflation under full commitment, $1 - \Delta_{FC}$. The table also shows the critical interest rate, $\tilde{\iota}$, that separates the type-A equilibrium from the type-B equilibrium.*

The estimated velocity gets closer to its observed value when considering the optimal increase rather than the zero-to-one increase in $\pi$, while the gap between the model’s and the observed money demand elasticity slightly increases. Furthermore, the welfare cost of inflation is higher under the optimal market access shift than it is under the zero-to-one shift. For example, under competitive pricing, the elasticity of money demand increases from $-0.36$ with $\pi = 1$ to $-0.43$ with $\pi = 0.63$, while the welfare cost of inflation increases from $0.55$ percent with $\pi = 1$ to $0.70$ percent with $\pi = 0.63$. Table 6 also shows the critical interest rate, $\tilde{\iota}$, that separates the type-A equilibrium from the type-B equilibrium. For all the trading protocols, we find that $\tilde{\iota}$ is close to 2 percent and thus our estimates of the welfare cost of inflation are not affected by the type-A equilibrium. The simulated money demand properties under competitive pricing are shown in Figure 8.
Our numerical results indicate that the improved liquidity provision by financial intermediaries ($\pi > 0$) can replicate the observed shift in money demand as well as the lower elasticity of money demand to a large extent. Furthermore, limited commitment delivers an explanation of why aggregate credit provision remains subdued despite record low nominal interest rates. Hence, in the current environment, a higher nominal interest rate might even boost consumption and credit expansion rather than restrain it.

5.4 Discussion

As discussed in several instances throughout the paper, the introduction of MMDAs in the 1980s and the sweep technology of the 1990s had two effects. First, it effectively allowed agents to earn interest on their transaction balances. Second, it allowed for a more efficient allocation of money in the economy. Our money market also displays these two effects. It is, therefore, straightforward to study these two effects in isolation in our model. We first study the counterfactual experiment of paying interest on money without reallocating liquidity on the relation between M1S money demand and the triple AAA interest rate. We, then, perform the counterfactual experiment that the money market reallocates liquidity without paying interest on money.

5.4.1 The effects of paying interest on money

In this subsection, we assume that agents continue to earn interest on their idle money holdings in the money market, but that no credit is available. This means that no cash
is reallocated. To avoid introducing any additional distortion, the interest rate on idle money is financed via lump-sum taxes. With these assumptions, the marginal value of money is

$$\frac{\gamma - \beta}{\beta} = (1 - n) \delta \left[ \frac{u'(q)}{g'(q)} - 1 \right] + \pi n i,$$

where $i$ here is exogenous and set equal to the endogenous interest rate that we obtain in the unrestricted model. That is, we allow agents to earn the same interest rates as they do under the experiment described in Figure 8. We assume that there was a one-time shift in $\pi$ from $\pi = 0$ to $\pi = 0.63$ in 1990. The simulation results are displayed Figure 9 below.

![Figure 9: Money demand with interest-bearing money](image)

Intuitively, the possibility to earn interest payments on idle money holdings increases the demand for money, as it reduces the opportunity cost of holding money. This shifts the money demand function up and to the right which is inconsistent with the empirical observation (see the curve labeled No Reallocation with $\pi = 0.63$).

Therefore, we conclude that it is the reallocation of money through money markets that shifts the money demand curve downwards. To confirm this intuition, we conduct a further counterfactual experiment below.

### 5.4.2 The effects of reallocating the medium of exchange

Here, we continue to assume the existence of a money market that reallocates money, but we artificially hold the interest rate at zero. By doing so, the market clearing condition
in the money market continues to hold; i.e., \( g(q) = (1 - n) g(\hat{q}) \). Furthermore, the marginal value of money satisfies

\[
\frac{\gamma - \beta}{\beta} = (1 - n) \delta \left\{ \pi \left[ \frac{u'(q)}{g'(\hat{q})} - 1 \right] + (1 - \pi) \left[ \frac{u'(q)}{g'(q)} - 1 \right] \right\}.
\]

Using the calibrated parameter values and assuming that there was a one-time shift in \( \pi \) from \( \pi = 0 \) to \( \pi = 0.63 \) in 1990, we obtain the simulation results shown in Figure 10.

As in our previous experiment, in Figure 10 we also increase access to the money market from \( \pi = 0 \) to \( \pi = 0.63 \) at the beginning of the 1990s. Here, we assume that no interest is paid on money market deposits. Figure 10 shows that in this case money demand drops more (see the curve labeled Model with \( \pi = 0.63 \) and \( i = 0\% \)) than when we pay interest on idle money balances (see the curve labeled Model with \( \pi = 0.63 \)). Thus, it is the more efficient allocation of money through the money market that is the driving force behind the downward shift in money demand.

6 Robustness

In this section we perform two robustness checks.
6.1 Money demand shift in 1980 instead of 1990

As a robustness check, we follow Lucas and Nicolini (2013) and assume that the technological one-time shift in $\pi$ was realized in 1980 and that $\pi$ remained constant thereafter. For this purpose, we re-calibrate the model with $\pi = 0$ for the period from 1950 to 1979. We obtain a target value of the nominal interest rate of $i = 0.055$ and the real interest rate of $r = 0.039$, which corresponds to a value of $\beta = (1 + r)^{-1} = 0.963$. Furthermore, we set $A$ to match the average velocity of money of $v = 4.42$ and $\alpha$ such that the model reproduces an elasticity of money demand with respect to the AAA corporate bond yield of $\xi = -0.641$. The markup-target under Kalai and Nash bargaining remains unchanged at $\mu = 0.30$. The calibration results are presented in Table 7 below.

Table 7: Calibration from 1950 to 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nash Bargaining</th>
<th>Kalai Bargaining</th>
<th>Comp. Pricing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>1.828</td>
<td>2.266</td>
<td>1.914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>0.676</td>
<td>0.708</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1 - \Delta$</td>
<td>2.32%</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
<td>1.44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 7 displays the calibrated values for the key parameters $A$, $\alpha$ and $\theta$ for $\pi = 0$. Table 7 also displays the welfare cost of inflation, $1 - \Delta$, which is the percentage of total consumption agents would be willing to give up in order to be in a steady state with a nominal interest rate of 3 percent instead of 13 percent.

Calibrating the model to the period from 1950 to 1979 results in a higher welfare cost of inflation. For instance, under competitive pricing we obtain a welfare cost of inflation of 1.44 percent as compared to 1.27 percent when we calibrate the model to the 1950 to 1989 period. Furthermore, the goods-market share of total output, $s_{GM}$, increases by roughly one percentage point to 5.7 percent.

As before, we search numerically for the value of $\pi$ that minimizes the squared error between the model-implied money demand and the data. The simulation results are shown in Table 8.
Table 8: Full commitment - optimal market access

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Nash Bargaining</th>
<th>Kalai Bargaining</th>
<th>Comp. Pricing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-2010</td>
<td>6.56</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>7.04</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velocity</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1 - \Delta_{FC}$</td>
<td>1.48%</td>
<td>1.33%</td>
<td>1.13% (2.10%)</td>
<td>0.80% (1.44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tilde{i}$</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 8 displays the simulation results of the velocity of money and the elasticity of money demand with respect to the AAA interest rate after a one-time increase in the access probability to the money market from $\pi = 0$ to the optimal value of $\pi$ in 1980. Table 8 also displays the welfare cost of inflation under full commitment, $1 - \Delta_{FC}$. The table also shows the critical interest rate, $\tilde{i}$, that separates the type-A equilibrium from the type-B equilibrium.*

Table 8 shows that the model performs well in replicating the higher velocity of money for the period from 1980 to 2010, but that it fails to replicate the lower elasticity of money demand. The simulated money demand properties under competitive pricing are shown in Figure 11.

![Figure 11: One-time shift in $\pi$ in 1980](image)

### 6.2 Initial value of $\pi > 0$

What happens if the initial value of $\pi$ is greater than 0 in the calibration of the model for the period from 1950 to 1989? To respond to this question, we calibrate the model
with the initial values of $\pi = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6$ and $0.8$. Thereafter, we assume that in 1990 there was a one-time shift in $\pi$ from the initial value to $\pi = 1$. Feeding in the actual path of the nominal interest rate allows us to simulate the model and to compare the model-implied money demand properties with the data. For this experiment, we assume full commitment and competitive pricing in the goods market. The calibration and simulation results are provided in Table 9 below.

**Table 9: Calibration from 1950 to 1989**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calibration</th>
<th>Data 1990-2010</th>
<th>$\pi = 0$</th>
<th>$\pi = 0.2$</th>
<th>$\pi = 0.4$</th>
<th>$\pi = 0.6$</th>
<th>$\pi = 0.8$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.171</td>
<td>1.807</td>
<td>1.463</td>
<td>1.274</td>
<td>1.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1 - \Delta$</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.27%</td>
<td>1.28%</td>
<td>1.28%</td>
<td>1.29%</td>
<td>1.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velocity</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>7.03</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>5.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1 - \Delta_{FC}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.55%</td>
<td>0.68%</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
<td>1.04%</td>
<td>1.18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first part of Table 9 displays the calibrated values for the key parameters $A$ and $\alpha$ for $\pi = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6,$ and $0.8$. Table 9 also displays the welfare cost of inflation under the initial value of $\pi = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6,$ and $0.8$. The second part of Table 9 displays the simulation results of the velocity of money and the elasticity of money demand with respect to the AAA interest rate after a one-time increase in the access probability to the money market from the initial value of $\pi = 1$ in 1990. Table 9 also displays the welfare cost of inflation under full commitment with $\pi = 1, 1 - \Delta_{FC}$.

Increasing the initial value of $\pi$ results in a lower calibrated value of $\alpha$ and $A$ and tends to increase the welfare cost of inflation slightly. The simulation results highlight that a higher initial value of $\pi$ results in a less pronounced shift, and the elasticity of money demand remains higher. This contradicts the data, where the elasticity of money demand has decreased substantially since the 1990s. Intuitively, a higher initial value of $\pi$ results in a higher welfare cost of inflation after the one-time shift to $\pi = 1$.

### 7 Literature

In this section, we discuss several papers in more detail and relate their results to ours.

**Lucas and Nicolini (2013).** A closely related paper is Lucas and Nicolini (2013). They first document the empirical breakdown of the previously stable relation between M1 and interest rates that occurred in the 1980s. They, then, discuss the possible factors such as financial deregulation that could explain the observed break-down. Finally, they construct a novel monetary aggregate called NewM1 and show that there is a stable negative relation between NewM1 and the relevant opportunity cost of holding the various components of NewM1. In the theory part of their paper, the monetary aggregate is derived endogenously according to the different role played by currency, reserves, and commercial bank deposits as means of payment. They assume two means of exchange (cash and checks). Consumption goods are of different size and the use of checks in transactions is profitable only if the size of the consumption good is sufficiently large. They
find that the new monetary aggregate performs as well on low and medium frequencies during the period 1915-2008, as was the case with M1 for the period 1915-1990.

At the time of our writing, we had no access to their new monetary aggregate NewM1.

**Faig and Jerez (2007).** Our paper is also closely related to Faig and Jerez (2007) who study money demand and money velocity in a search model with villages, where money is necessary for goods transactions. They assume that buyers are subject to idiosyncratic preference shocks, and only a fraction of them \((1 - \theta)\) can readjust their money holdings before trading in the goods market. This generates a role for the precautionary demand of money. Using United States data from 1892 to 2003, Faig and Jerez (2007) show that the demand for money and the welfare cost of inflation decreased dramatically at the end of the sample. In Table 3, they show that the welfare cost of inflation was 0.15 percent in 2003 as opposed to 1 percent for most of the 20th century.\(^{17}\) Their estimates of \(\theta\) are decreasing over time with \(\theta\) being equal to 1 in 1892 and 0.139 in 2003. They also document that the demand for precautionary balances almost halved in the last part of the sample, being 47 percent in 2003 as opposed to over 80 percent for all the preceding years, while the velocity of money showed an upward trend over the second half of the past century.

Our model differs from Faig and Jerez (2007) in several dimensions. We also consider limited commitment while they assume full commitment. As shown above, limited commitment and full commitment lead to different theoretical results, and the estimates differ quantitatively as well. Agents’ preferences and the matching technology are also different in both papers. Faig and Jerez (2007) assume that agents are matched with certainty in the goods market, while we allow for the possibility of them being unmatched. They assume that buyers are subject to preference shocks, while we abstract from this possibility. The two papers also differ in terms of the monetary aggregate used in the data. We use M1 adjusted for retail sweep accounts, while they use M1 minus the currency held abroad. Finally, Faig and Jerez (2007) focus on competitive search in the goods market, while we consider Nash, Kalai, and competitive pricing. Our results are qualitatively similar to theirs. However, we find that the drop in the welfare cost of inflation, due to financial innovation, is smaller than the one reported by them.

**Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2011, BMW hereafter).** In the extension section, BMW introduce bilateral trade credit into the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework to investigate whether this modification can account for the observed downward shift in money demand. They find that it can account for this to a large extent, but that the elasticity of money demand moves into the wrong direction. To replicate the effects of bilateral trade credit, we perform the same experiment as BMW. That is, we assume that until 1990 the probability that a bilateral meeting between a buyer and a seller is non-anonymous is zero; note that bilateral credit is feasible in non-anonymous meetings. After 1990, the probability that such a meeting is non-anonymous is \(\pi = 0.28\) (see Figure 12). The value of \(\pi = 0.28\) is chosen numerically, such that the squared error between

\(^{17}\)When deriving the welfare cost of inflation, Faig and Jerez (2007) consider an increase of the inflation rate from 0 percent to 10 percent.

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the model-implied money demand and the data is minimized.

In particular, introducing bilateral trade credit results in a downward shift in money demand and an increase in the elasticity of money demand, which conflicts with the data. In Table 10, we compare the effects of a one-time increase in $\pi$ in BMW (i.e., from $\pi = 0$ to $\pi = 0.28$) with the optimal shift suggested by our model (i.e., from $\pi = 0$ to $\pi = 0.63$).

**Figure 12: Simulated bilateral trade credit**

![Graph showing simulated bilateral trade credit](image)

**Table 10: Comparison of results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data 1990-2010</th>
<th>BMW</th>
<th>Our model FC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Velocity</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>6.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.85</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 10 displays the velocity of money and the elasticity of money demand with respect to the AAA interest rate for the period from 1990 to 2010 in BMW and in our model under full commitment (FC). For the simulation, we assumed competitive pricing in the goods market.

As can be seen from Table 10, modeling financial intermediation through a money market as compared to trade credit in BMW, allows us to replicate the change in the elasticity of money demand. In BMW, the elasticity increases, while in our framework it decreases.
Reynard (2004). Reynard (2004) studies the stability of money demand in the United States using cross-sectional data. In particular, he relates the evolution of financial market participation to the downward shift in the money demand and its higher interest rate elasticity observed in 1970s. Agents who participate in the financial market can hold both money and non-monetary assets (NMA), whereas the latter are assets that can be converted into money by paying a transaction cost — example of NMA are certificates of deposits, stocks, and bonds. Agents who do not participate in the financial market can only hold money. Reynard (2004) shows that an important component of financial market participation is the household’s real financial wealth, which increased steadily during the 1960s and 1970s, and that the probability of holding NMA is positively related to the household’s wealth. He then uses the measure of asset market participation to estimate the stability of money demand. He finds that, as real wealth and the opportunity cost of holding money increased during the 1970s, a higher portion of the population decided to participate in the financial market and hold part of the wealth in NMA. This shifted the interest rate elasticity of money demand upwards since only agents who participate in the financial market can adjust their portfolio of money and NMA when interest rates change. Thus, using cross-sectional data, Reynard (2004) concludes that the money demand remains stable during the post war period, while previous time-series studies "inappropriately" suggest instability and their estimates of the interest rate elasticity are "flawed".

Teles and Zhou (2005). Teles and Zhou (2005) also observe that the stable relationship between M1 and the interest rate broke down at the end of the 1970s. Their view is that M1 is no longer a good measure of the transaction demand for money after 1980. Before 1980, there was a clear distinction between M1 and M2: M1 could be used for transactions and did not yield any rate of return, while M2 offered a positive rate of return but could not be used for transactions. Since 1980, this distinction vanished due to changes in regulation, development of electronic payments, and the introduction of retail sweep programs. Teles and Zhou (2005) show that an appropriate measure of the transaction demand for money after 1980 is provided by the money zero maturity aggregate (MZM). This money aggregate includes financial instruments that can be used for transaction immediately at zero cost. They show that the long run relationship between the money demand and the interest rate is restored when M1 is used for the period 1900-1979 and MZM for the period 1980-2003.

Ireland (2009). Lucas’s (2000) quantifies the welfare costs of inflation. Ireland (2009) revisits the Lucas’s (2000) results by using new data made available from 1995 to 2006. This is the period where intensive sweep retail programs have been introduced by severely distorting the role of M1 as a measure of the transaction demand for money. Due to the change in the nature of M1, a new aggregate, M1RS, has been used in Ireland’s (2009) estimations; M1RS is computed by adding the value of sweep funds into M1. To isolate the recent behavior of the money demand, Ireland (2009) focuses on two subperiods, 1980-2006 and 1900-1979. He shows that the relation between M1RS and the interest rate remains stable in the period after 1980, but that relationship looks different than that highlighted by Lucas (2000). He finds that the modest growth of M1RS observed in
earlier data can be better explained by a semi-log specification of the money demand, as opposed to the log-log specification proposed by Lucas (2000). Furthermore, the interest rate elasticity of the money demand seems to be much lower in 1980-2006 than what it used to be from 1900 to 1979. Both these changes lead to estimates of the welfare cost of inflation which are lower than those in Lucas (2000).

**VanHoose and Humphrey (2001).** VanHoose and Humphrey (2001) study the effect of the introduction of retail sweep accounts on bank reserves and the ability of the Federal Reserve to conduct monetary policy. In particular, they investigate the effect of lower required reserve balances on funds rate volatility and monetary policy in a model of optimal bank reserve management. They document that the introduction of retail sweep accounts that began in 1993 reduced the required bank reserves at the FED by 70 percent. Theoretically, VanHoose and Humphrey show that lower bank reserves have an ambiguous effect on the fund rate volatility. On the one hand, lower reserve requirements reduce sensitivity of the demand for reserves and funds borrowing to variations in the Fed funds rate, which makes the funds rate more volatile. On the other hand, lower reserve requirements, increase, for any level of total reserve balances, the portion of reserves the banks can use to cover unexpected payments, which ultimately reduce the overnight funds demand and so the volatility of the overnight funds rate. As a result, the composite effect of lower reserve balances on the funds rate volatility is ambiguous. Moreover, the higher Fed funds rate volatility, which may be triggered by the reduced reserve balances, can be transmitted to the yield curve and raise the volatility of the short-term interest rate, thereby affecting the effectiveness of monetary policy. Empirically, VanHoose and Humphrey test for this possibility. They find that lower reserve balances increase the short-term interest rate volatility only before the period where the Fed publicly announced the target of the funds rate. After the funds rate target was announced, the effect of lower reserve requirements on the short-term interest rates was not significant.

**Baumol-Tobin cash-management models.** The impact of financial innovation on money demand and money velocity has been also studied using Baumol-Tobin cash-management models (e.g., Attanasio, Guiso and Jappelli, 2002, and Alvarez and Lippi, 2009). Using micro data from an Italian survey from 1989 to 1995, Attanasio, Guiso and Jappelli (2002) study the implication of the Automated Teller Machine (ATM) card adoption on money demand, interest and the expenditure elasticity of money demand, and the welfare cost of inflation. They show that the interest-rate elasticity for households with an ATM card is twice as large as it is for households which do not possess one, i.e., $-0.59$ as opposed to $-0.27$ (Table 3, p.331). Overall, they estimate a welfare cost of inflation that equates to 0.06 percent of nondurable consumption. They also show that the welfare cost of inflation is higher for households with an ATM card (0.09 percent). Some recent extensions of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) have studied exogenous versus endogenous market segmentation (Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond, 2009, and Chiu, 2012). In these models, agents decide to transfer the money from the goods market to the credit market periodically. As a result, only a fraction of them are able to trade in the credit market at a given point in time. These works do not investigate the effect of financial innovation on the precautionary demand for money.
percent) than for households without (0.05 percent), and that it is declining over time for each household’s type (Table 4, p.339).

Using the same data set from 1993 to 2004, Alvarez and Lippi (2009) estimate the effect of ATM card use on money demand in a model with random withdrawal arrival rates. They estimate an interest rate elasticity of money demand equal to 0.43 for households with ATM cards, and 0.48 for households without (p. 391). They also show that, as a result of the financial innovation, the welfare loss of inflation in 2004 is approximately 40 percent smaller than it was in 1993 (Table VII, p.394).

Our paper differs from Attanasio, Guiso and Jappelli (2002) and Alvarez and Lippi (2009) in several dimensions. First, our theoretical framework is substantially different from theirs. We build our setup on Lagos and Wright (2005) and extend it to allow agents to lend and borrow cash in a money market before goods transactions take place. Since this is a paper that deals with money demand behavior, we believe it is important to be explicit about the frictions that make money essential: agent’s anonymity, lack of double coincidence of wants, and lack of public communication. The Lagos and Wright framework is convenient for our study, since it includes all these frictions in a tractable way. Second, our concept of financial innovation is not related to ATM card use but, instead, focuses on the increasing use of sweep accounts since the 1990s. We claim that this innovation, which allows for automatic transfers of excess funds from a checking account into a higher interest-bearing account (typically into a money market fund) has dramatically changed the demand for money, as well as its interest-rate elasticity, and the welfare cost of inflation. Third, here, we focus on the possible structural break that occurred in money demand and in the interest-rate elasticity of money demand following the introduction of the sweep accounts. We test for the structural break using different subperiods in the range between 1950 and 2010, for different patterns of participation in the money market. Fourth, like in Lucas (2000) and most of the literature following Lagos and Wright (2005), we use M1, while the studies discussed above use monetary aggregates that are smaller than M1. (For example, they do not include the money demand of firms or interest-bearing bank deposits.) This may explain, in part, why our estimates of the welfare cost of inflation are substantially higher than theirs.

8 Conclusion

At the beginning of the 1990s the empirical relation between M1 and the movements in interest rates began to fall apart. In this paper, we ask of what accounts for this shift and the lower interest-rate elasticity of money demand. To answer this question, we construct a microfounded monetary model with a money market. Agents face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks which generate an ex-post inefficient allocation of the medium of exchange: some agents will hold cash but have no current need for it, while other agents will hold insufficient cash for their liquidity needs. We find that the money market affects money demand via two channels. First, it allows agents who hold cash, but have no current need for it, to earn interest. Second, it allows agents who hold insufficient

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19 Some previous studies on cross-sectional household data report elasticities smaller than 0.25 (e.g., Lippi and Secchi, 2009, and Daniels and Murphy, 1994).
cash to borrow and, by doing so, reallocates the existing stock of cash more efficiently.

We calibrate the model to U.S. data and find that a one-time increase in the access probability to the money market at the beginning of the 1990s replicates the behavior of money demand very well. This result suggests that the emergence of money market deposit accounts in the 1980s and the introduction of the sweep technology in the 1990s are responsible for the observed empirical changes in money demand.
9 Appendix I: Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1. In order to derive equations (8)-(11), we first characterize the solutions to the agent’s decision problems stated in the text.

The first-order conditions of the agent’s problem (1) are

\[ U'(x) = 1, \quad \text{and} \quad \beta \frac{\partial V_1}{\partial m_{+1}} = \phi. \] (32)

The term \( \beta \frac{\partial V_1}{\partial m_{+1}} \) reflects the marginal value of taking one additional unit of money into the next period, and \( \phi \) is the marginal cost of doing so. As in Lagos and Wright (2005), the choice of \( m_{+1} \) is independent of \( m \). As a result, each agent exits the centralized market with the same amount of money, and so the distribution of money holdings is degenerate at the beginning of a period. The envelope conditions are

\[ \frac{\partial V_3}{\partial m} = \phi, \quad \frac{\partial V_3}{\partial d} = \phi (1 + i), \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial V_3}{\partial \ell} = -\phi (1 + i). \] (33)

The marginal value of money at the beginning of the centralized market is equal to the price of money in terms of centralized market goods. This implies that the value function \( V_3 \) is linear in \( m \). The value function for a buyer in the goods market is

\[ V_2^b(m, \ell, 0) = \delta [u(q) + V_3(m - z, \ell, 0)] + (1 - \delta) V_3(m, \ell, 0). \]

The buyer’s envelope conditions are

\[ \frac{\partial V_2^b}{\partial m} = \delta \left[ u'(q) \frac{\partial q}{\partial m} + \phi \left(1 - \frac{\partial z}{\partial m}\right)\right] + (1 - \delta) \phi, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial V_2^b}{\partial \ell} = -\phi (1 + i). \] (34)

If the buyer’s constraint (3) is not binding, then \( \frac{\partial q}{\partial m} = 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial z}{\partial m} = 0 \). In this case, the buyer’s first envelope condition reduces to \( \frac{\partial V_2^b}{\partial m} = \frac{\partial V_3}{\partial m} = \phi \). If the constraint is binding, then \( \frac{\partial q}{\partial m} = \frac{\phi}{g'(q)} \) and \( \frac{\partial z}{\partial m} = 1 \). In this case, the buyer’s envelope conditions in the goods market become

\[ \frac{\partial V_2^b}{\partial m} = \delta \phi \frac{u'(q)}{g'(q)} + \phi (1 - \delta), \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial V_2^b}{\partial \ell} = -\phi (1 + i). \] (35)

The value function for a seller in the goods market is

\[ V_2^s(m, 0, d) = \delta [-q + V_3(m + z, 0, d)] + (1 - \delta) V_3(m, 0, d), \]

and envelope conditions are

\[ \frac{\partial V_2^s}{\partial m} = \phi, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial V_2^s}{\partial d} = \phi (1 + i). \] (35)

The first-order condition of the buyer’s problem (6) is

\[ \frac{\partial V_2^b}{\partial m} + \frac{\partial V_2^b}{\partial \ell} = 0. \] (36)
The first-order condition of the seller’s problem (7) in the money market is
\[
- \frac{\partial V^s_2}{\partial m} + \frac{\partial V^s_2}{\partial d} = \lambda_s.
\] (37)

The envelope condition of (5) is
\[
\frac{\partial V_1}{\partial m} = \pi \left[ (1 - n) \frac{\partial V^b_2}{\partial m} + n \frac{\partial V^s_2}{\partial m} \right] + (1 - \pi) \left[ (1 - n) \frac{\partial V^b_2}{\partial m} + n \frac{\partial V^s_2}{\partial d} \right].
\]

Applying the envelope theorem to (6) and (7), the above envelope condition can be rewritten as
\[
\frac{\partial V_1}{\partial m} = \pi \left[ (1 - n) \frac{\partial V^b_2}{\partial m} + n \left( \frac{\partial V^s_2}{\partial m} + \lambda_s \right) \right] + (1 - \pi) \left[ (1 - n) \frac{V^b_2}{\partial m} + n \frac{V^s_2}{\partial m} \right].
\] (38)

We can now derive the type-A equilibrium equations (8)-(11).

**Derivation of (8).** The real amount of money an active buyer spends in the goods market, \(g(\hat{q})\), is equal to the real amount of money spent as a passive buyer, \(g(q)\), plus the real loan an active buyer receives from the bank, \(\phi \ell\).

**Derivation of (9) and (10).** Assuming \(\lambda_s = 0\), (37) becomes
\[
- \frac{\partial V^s_2}{\partial m} + \frac{\partial V^s_2}{\partial d} = 0.
\] (39)

Substituting \(\frac{\partial V^b_2}{\partial m}, \frac{\partial V^b_2}{\partial \ell}, \frac{\partial V^s_2}{\partial m}, \) and \(\frac{\partial V^s_2}{\partial d}\) from (34) and (35), the first-order conditions in the money market, (36) and (37), can be written as (9) and (10), respectively.

**Derivation of (11).** From (9) and (10), \(u'(\hat{q}) = g'(\hat{q})\). Use \(\lambda_s = 0\), (34), (35), and \(u'(\hat{q}) = g'(\hat{q})\), to rewrite (38) as follows:
\[
\frac{\partial V_1}{\partial m} = \phi + (1 - \pi) (1 - n) \phi \delta \left[ \frac{u'(q)}{g'(q)} - 1 \right].
\]

Update this expression by one period and replace \(\frac{\partial V_1}{\partial m}\) using (32), to obtain (11). ■

**Proof of Proposition 2.** Equations (12)-(15) hold in a type-B equilibrium. Equation (12) is equal to (8), so we refer to the proof of Proposition 1 for its derivation.

**Derivation of (13).** Substituting \(\frac{\partial V^b_2}{\partial m}, \frac{\partial V^b_2}{\partial \ell}, \frac{\partial V^s_2}{\partial m}, \) and \(\frac{\partial V^s_2}{\partial d}\) from (34) and (35), the first-order conditions in the money market, (36) and (37), become
\[
(13), \quad \phi \hat{i} = \lambda_s.
\] (40)

respectively. Unlike the type-A equilibrium, the deposit constraint is binding here, and therefore the interest rate is strictly greater than zero in a type-B equilibrium. The second equation in (40) gives us the value of the multiplier.

**Derivation of (14).** In a type-B equilibrium, active sellers deposit all their money at the bank; i.e., \(d = m\). Moreover, active buyers carry \(\hat{m}\) units of money out of the money market, where \(\hat{m} = m + \ell\), and the market clearing condition in the money market requires that total deposits must be equal to total loans; i.e., \(\pi nd = \pi (1 - n) \ell\). Using
\( d = m \) and \( \tilde{m} = m + \ell \), the market clearing condition in the money market can be rewritten as \( m = (1 - n) \tilde{m} \). Multiplying each side of the last equation by \( \phi \), and using (4), we obtain (14).

**Derivation of (15).** Use (40) and the envelope conditions in the goods market, (34) and (35), to rewrite the money market envelope condition (38) as follows

\[
\frac{\partial V_1}{\partial m} = \pi \phi \left[ \delta \frac{u'(\tilde{q})}{g'(\tilde{q})} + 1 - \delta \right] + (1 - \pi) \phi \left\{ (1 - n) \left[ \delta \frac{u'(q)}{g'(q)} + 1 - \delta \right] + n \right\}.
\]

Finally, update this expression by one period and replace \( \frac{\partial V_1}{\partial m} \) using (32), to obtain (15).

**Proof of Lemma 1.** Since a buyer has to work to repay his debt, he may default in the centralized market. Here, we derive conditions such that debt repayment is voluntary. In what follows, we denote variables of a defaulting agent (or deviator) with a tilde “\( \sim \)”. A defaulting buyer’s value function at the beginning of the centralized market is

\[
\tilde{V}_3 (m) = U (x^*) - \tilde{h} + \beta \tilde{V}_1 (\tilde{m} + 1)
\]

and his budget constraint \( x^* + \phi \tilde{m} + 1 = \tilde{h} + \phi m + \phi T \). Note that non-repayment only affects hours of work and the amount of money a buyer takes into the next period. By eliminating \( \tilde{h} \) using the budget constraint, the value function \( \tilde{V}_3 (m) \) can be rewritten as

\[
\tilde{V}_3 (m) = U (x^*) - x^* - \phi \tilde{m} + 1 + \phi m + \phi T + \beta \tilde{V}_1 (\tilde{m} + 1).
\]

The value function of a buyer who repays his loan in the centralized market is

\[
V_3 (m) = U (x^*) - h + \beta V_1 (m + 1),
\]

and his budget constraint \( x^* + \phi m + 1 = h + \phi m + \phi T - (1 + i) \ell. \) By eliminating \( h \) using the budget constraint, we can rewrite \( V_3 (m) \) as

\[
V_3 (m) = U (x^*) - x^* - \phi m + 1 + \phi m + \phi T - (1 + i) \ell + \beta V_1 (m + 1).
\]

A buyer repays his loan if and only if \( V_3 (m) \geq \tilde{V}_3 (m) \), which implies

\[
\phi (1 + i) \ell \leq \phi \tilde{m} + 1 - \phi m + 1 + \beta \left[ V_1 (m + 1) - \tilde{V}_1 (\tilde{m} + 1) \right].
\] (41)

Let us now derive \( \tilde{V}_1 (\tilde{m} + 1) \) and \( V_1 (m + 1) \).

**Derivation of \( \tilde{V}_1 (\tilde{m} + 1) \).** A deviator is banned forever from the money market. The next-period value function of a deviator is

\[
\tilde{V}_1 (\tilde{m} + 1) = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \left[ (1 - n) \delta u (\tilde{q}) - n \delta^* \tilde{q} + U (x^*) - \tilde{h} \right],
\]

where \( \tilde{q} \equiv \pi \tilde{q} + (1 - \pi) q \) is the expected (or average) quantity he produces if he is a seller; with probability \( \pi \) the buyer he meets is active, in which case he produces \( \tilde{q} \), while with probability \( 1 - \pi \) the buyer is passive, in which case he produces \( q \). The first two terms within brackets are the expected net payoff in the goods market, while the third
and fourth terms equal the net payoff in the centralized market. Expected hours of work for a defector in the centralized market are \( h = (1 - n) \tilde{h}_b + nh_s \), where \( \tilde{h}_b \) and \( \tilde{h}_s \) are expected hours of work of a buyer and a seller, respectively, and are defined as

\[
\tilde{h}_b = \delta \left[ x^* + \phi_{+1} \tilde{m}_{+2} - \phi_{+1} \tilde{m}_{+1} - \phi_{+1} T_{+1} + g(\bar{q}) \right] + (1 - \delta) \left[ x^* + \phi_{+1} \tilde{m}_{+2} - \phi_{+1} \tilde{m}_{+1} - \phi_{+1} T_{+1} \right]
\]

\[
= x^* + \phi_{+1} \tilde{m}_{+2} - \phi_{+1} \tilde{m}_{+1} - \phi_{+1} T_{+1} + \delta g(\bar{q})
\]

and

\[
\tilde{h}_s = \delta^* \left[ x^* + \phi_{+1} \tilde{m}_{+2} - \phi_{+1} \tilde{m}_{+1} - \phi_{+1} T_{+1} - \bar{g} \right] + (1 - \delta^*) \left[ x^* + \phi_{+1} \tilde{m}_{+2} - \phi_{+1} \tilde{m}_{+1} - \phi_{+1} T_{+1} \right]
\]

\[
= x^* + \phi_{+1} \tilde{m}_{+2} - \phi_{+1} \tilde{m}_{+1} - \phi_{+1} T_{+1} - \delta^* \bar{g},
\]

respectively. If the deviator is a seller in the next period, then he receives, in the goods market, an average amount of money, in real terms, equal to \( \bar{g} \equiv \pi g(\bar{q}) + (1 - \pi) g(q) \). Hence, using \((1 - n) \delta^* = n \delta \), expected hours of work for a deviator can be rewritten as

\[
\tilde{h} = (1 - n) \tilde{h}_b + n \tilde{h}_s
\]

\[
= x^* + \phi_{+1} \tilde{m}_{+2} - \phi_{+1} \tilde{m}_{+1} - \phi_{+1} T_{+1} + (1 - n) \delta [g(\bar{q}) - \bar{g}].
\]

Moreover, using \( \tilde{m}_{+2} = \gamma \tilde{m}_{+1} \) and \( T_{+1} = (\gamma - 1) m_{+1} \), we can rewrite \( \tilde{h} \) as follows

\[
\tilde{h} = x^* + (\gamma - 1) \phi_{+1} \tilde{m}_{+1} - (\gamma - 1) \phi_{+1} m_{+1} + (1 - n) \delta [g(\bar{q}) - \bar{g}]
\]

\[
= x^* + (\gamma - 1) [g(\bar{q}) - g(q)] + (1 - n) \delta [g(\bar{q}) - \bar{g}].
\]

Substituting \( \tilde{h} \) into \( \tilde{V}_{+1}(\tilde{m}_{+1}) \) yields

\[
\tilde{V}_{+1}(\tilde{m}_{+1}) = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \left\{ (1 - n) \delta u(\bar{q}) - n \delta^* \bar{q} + U(x^*) - x^* \right. \\
\left. - (\gamma - 1) [g(\bar{q}) - g(q)] - (1 - n) \delta [g(\bar{q}) - \bar{g}] \right\}.
\]

**Derivation of \( V_{+1}(m_{+1}) \).** Let \( \bar{u} \equiv \pi u(\bar{q}) + (1 - \pi) u(q) \) be the expected utility of a nondeviating buyer in the goods market. If the buyer is active, he enjoys utility \( u(\bar{q}) \); if he is passive, he enjoys utility \( u(q) \). The next-period value function of a nondeviator is

\[
V_{+1}(m_{+1}) = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \left\{ (1 - n) \delta \bar{u} - n \delta^* \bar{q} + U(x^*) - h \right\}.
\]

Note that the average disutility, \( \bar{q} \), suffered by a seller in the goods market depends on his trading partner’s participation status, active vs passive, and not on his participation status. Expected hours of work of a nondeviator in the centralized market are \( h = (1 - n) h_b + nh_s \), where

\[
h_b = \delta \left[ x^* + \phi_{+1} m_{+2} - \phi_{+1} m_{+1} - \phi_{+1} T_{+1} + \bar{g} \right] + (1 - \delta) \left[ x^* + \phi_{+1} m_{+2} - \phi_{+1} m_{+1} - \phi_{+1} T_{+1} \right]
\]

\[
= x^* + \phi_{+1} m_{+2} - \phi_{+1} m_{+1} - \phi_{+1} T_{+1} + \delta \bar{g}
\]

38
and

\[ h_s = \delta^s \left[ x^* + \phi_{+1} m_{+2} - \phi_{+1} m_{+1} - \phi_{+1} T_{+1} - \tilde{g} \right] \\
+ (1 - \delta^s) \left[ x^* + \phi_{+1} m_{+2} - \phi_{+1} m_{+1} - \phi_{+1} T_{+1} \right] \\
= x^* + \phi_{+1} m_{+2} - \phi_{+1} m_{+1} - \phi_{+1} T_{+1} - \delta^s \tilde{g}. \]

Hence, average hours of work for a nondeviator are

\[ h = (1 - n) h_b + n h_s \]

\[ = x^* + \phi_{+1} m_{+2} - \phi_{+1} m_{+1} - \phi_{+1} T_{+1} \]

\[ = x^*, \]

where we have used \( T_{+1} = m_{+2} - m_{+1}. \) By replacing \( h \) in \( V_{+1}(m_{+1}) \), we obtain

\[ V_{+1}(m_{+1}) = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \{ (1 - n) \delta \tilde{u} - n \delta^s \tilde{q} + U(x^*) - x^* \}. \]

Using the above expressions to eliminate \( V_{+1}(m_{+1}) \) and \( \tilde{V}_{+1}(m_{+1}) \) into (41), we obtain

\[ \phi (1 + i) \ell \leq \phi \tilde{m}_{+1} - \phi m_{+1} + \beta \left[ V_{+1}(m_{+1}) - \tilde{V}_{+1}(m_{+1}) \right] \]

\[ = \gamma [\phi \tilde{m} - \phi m] + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \left\{ (1 - n) \delta [\pi u(\tilde{q}) + (1 - \pi) u(q)] - n \delta^s \tilde{q} + U(x^*) - x^* \right\} \]

\[ + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \left[ -(1 - n) \delta u(\tilde{q}) + n \delta^s \tilde{q} - U(x^*) + x^* \right] \]

or, after further simplification,

\[ \phi \ell \leq \frac{(\gamma - \beta) [g(\tilde{q}) - g(q)]}{(1 + i)(1 - \beta)} + \frac{\beta (1 - n) \delta \{ \pi [u(\tilde{q}) - g(\tilde{q})] + (1 - \pi) [u(q) - g(q)] - [u(\tilde{q}) - g(\tilde{q})] \}}{(1 + i)(1 - \beta)} \]

where \( \tilde{q} \) satisfies (18).

Derivation of (18). The envelope condition for a defector in the money market is

\[ \frac{\partial \tilde{V}_1}{\partial m} = (1 - n) \frac{\partial \tilde{V}_2}{\partial m} + n \frac{\partial \tilde{V}_2^s}{\partial m}. \]

which, substituting \( \partial \tilde{V}_2^b/\partial m \) and \( \partial \tilde{V}_2^s/\partial m \), can be written as

\[ \frac{\partial \tilde{V}_1}{\partial m} = (1 - n) \phi \left[ \delta \frac{u'(\tilde{q})}{g'(\tilde{q})} + 1 - \delta \right] + n \phi. \]

Updating the previous equation one period ahead, and using the first-order condition in the centralized market, we obtain (18).

Proof of Proposition 3. Equations (17), (18), and (20)-(23) hold in a type-0 equilibrium. The derivation of (17) and (18) is in the proof of Lemma 1. The derivation of
(20) is in the proof of Proposition 1. Equation (21) is straightforward and means that the real loan which a buyer receives from the bank is equal to the maximum amount he can get. This is a direct consequence of the fact that his borrowing constraint is binding in the type-0 equilibrium.

**Derivation of (22).** Let $\lambda_\Phi$ be the Lagrange multiplier on the buyer’s borrowing constraint (16). Then, the first-order condition to the buyer’s problem (19) is

\[
\frac{\partial V^b_x}{\partial m} + \frac{\partial V^b_x}{\partial \ell} = \lambda_\Phi. \tag{42}
\]

The first-order condition of the seller’s problem is (37). If $\lambda_\Phi > 0$ and $\lambda_s = 0$, then (42) and (37) can be written as

\[
\delta \left[ \frac{u'(\hat{q})}{g'(\hat{q})} - 1 \right] = \frac{\lambda_\Phi}{\phi} + i, \quad \text{and} \quad (22), \tag{43}
\]

respectively, where we have used (34) and (35) to eliminate $\frac{\partial V^b_x}{\partial m}$, $\frac{\partial V^s_x}{\partial \ell}$, $\frac{\partial V^s_x}{\partial m}$, and $\frac{\partial V^s_x}{\partial d}$. The first expression in (43) gives us the value of the multiplier $\lambda_\Phi$.

**Derivation of (23).** Use $\lambda_s = 0$ and the envelope conditions in the goods market, (34) and (35), to rewrite the money market envelope condition (38) as follows

\[
\frac{\partial V_1}{\partial m} = \phi(1 - n) \delta \left\{ \pi \left[ \frac{u'(\hat{q})}{g'(\hat{q})} - 1 \right] + (1 - \pi) \left[ \frac{u'(q)}{g'(q)} - 1 \right] \right\} + \phi. \tag{44}
\]

Finally, update this expression by one period and replace $\frac{\partial V_1}{\partial m}$ using (32), to get (23).

**Proof of Proposition 4.** Equations (17), (18), and (24)-(27) hold in a type-I equilibrium. The derivation of (17) and (18) is in the proof of Lemma 1. Equations (24) and (25) are identical to (20) and (21), respectively. Equation (26) is identical to (14).

**Derivation of (27).** Use (34) and (35) to substitute $\frac{\partial V^b_x}{\partial m}$ and $\frac{\partial V^b_x}{\partial \ell}$ in (42), and $\frac{\partial V^s_x}{\partial m}$ and $\frac{\partial V^s_x}{\partial d}$ in (37) to get

\[
\delta \frac{u'(q)}{g'(q)} - \delta - i = \frac{\lambda_\Phi}{\phi} \quad \text{and} \quad \phi i = \lambda_s, \tag{44}
\]

respectively. Again, eliminate $\frac{\partial V^b_x}{\partial m}$, $\frac{\partial V^s_x}{\partial m}$, and $\lambda_s$ into (38) using (34), (35), and (44), respectively, to obtain

\[
\frac{\partial V_1}{\partial m} = \pi\phi \left\{ (1 - n) \left[ \delta \frac{u'(\hat{q})}{g'(\hat{q})} + 1 - \delta \right] + n (1 + i) \right\} + (1 - \pi) \phi \left\{ (1 - n) \left[ \delta \frac{u'(q)}{g'(q)} + 1 - \delta \right] + n \right\}.
\]

Updating this expression by one period, and using (32) to replace $\frac{\partial V_1}{\partial m+1}$, we obtain (27).

**Proof of Proposition 5.** Equations (17), (18), and (28)-(31) hold in a type-II equilibrium. The derivation of (17) and (18) is in the proof of Lemma 1. Equations (28) and (30) are identical to (20) and (14), respectively.
Derivation of (29). In a type-II equilibrium, active sellers deposit all their money (i.e., \( s > 0 \)) and the buyer’s borrowing constraint is non-binding (i.e., \( \lambda_\Phi = 0 \)). Substituting \( \lambda_\Phi = 0 \) into (42), we obtain
\[
\frac{\partial V^b}{\partial m} + \frac{\partial V^b}{\partial \ell} = 0. \tag{45}
\]
Then, using (34) and (35) to substitute \( \frac{\partial V^b}{\partial m} \), \( \frac{\partial V^b}{\partial \ell} \), \( \frac{\partial V^s}{\partial m} \), and \( \frac{\partial V^s}{\partial \ell} \) in (45) and (37), we obtain
\[
(29), \quad \text{and} \quad i = \frac{\lambda_s}{\phi}. \tag{46}
\]
respectively. The second equation just gives us the value of the multiplier \( \lambda_s \).

Derivation of (31). Eliminate \( \frac{\partial V^b}{\partial m} \), \( \frac{\partial V^b}{\partial \ell} \), and \( \lambda_s \) into (38) using (34), (35), and (46), respectively, to get
\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial m} = \phi \left\{ i \pi + (1 - \pi) (1 - n) \delta \left[ \frac{u'(q)}{g'(q)} - 1 \right] + 1 \right\}. \tag{47}
\]
Updating this expression by one period, and using (32) to replace \( \frac{\partial V}{\partial m+1} \), we obtain (31).

10 Appendix II: Type III equilibrium

In the main text, we mention the existence of a further equilibrium, called type-III equilibrium. A type-III equilibrium has the following properties: active sellers do not deposit all their money (i.e., \( s = 0 \)) and the buyer’s borrowing constraint is non-binding (i.e., \( \lambda_\Phi = 0 \)).

Proposition 6 With limited commitment, a type-III equilibrium is a tuple \( \{ i, \hat{q}, \tilde{q}, q, \phi \ell, \phi \ell \} \) satisfying (17), (18), and
\[
g(\hat{q}) = g(q) + \phi \ell, \tag{47}
\]
\[
i = \delta \left[ \frac{u'(\hat{q})}{g'(\hat{q})} - 1 \right], \tag{48}
\]
\[
i = 0, \tag{49}
\]
\[
\frac{\gamma - \beta}{\beta} = (1 - \pi) (1 - n) \delta \left[ \frac{u'(q)}{g'(q)} - 1 \right]. \tag{50}
\]

The meaning of all equations in Proposition (6) is the same as for their counterparts in Proposition (5), except that (30) is now replaced by (49). Active buyers consume the first-best quantity and the nominal interest rate is zero in a type-III equilibrium.

By comparison of Propositions 6 and 1, it is easy to see that the type-III and type-A equilibria implement the same allocation. Indeed, in a type-III equilibrium, buyers are not borrowing-constrained. Hence, relaxing the borrowing constraint does not affect their decision.
Proof of Proposition 6. Equations (17), (18), and (47)-(50) hold in a type-III equilibrium. The derivation of (17) and (18) is in the proof of Lemma 1. Equations (47)-(50) are identical to (8)-(11); we refer to the proof of Proposition 1 for their derivation.

Now, let $\gamma_3$ be the value of $\gamma$ that separates type-III and type-II equilibria, then another sequence of equilibria can be summarized by Table A.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equilibria</th>
<th>$\gamma$</th>
<th>$\lambda_\Phi$</th>
<th>$\lambda_s$</th>
<th>Real borrowing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>type-III</td>
<td>$\beta &lt; \gamma &lt; \gamma_3$</td>
<td>$\lambda_\Phi = 0$</td>
<td>$\lambda_s = 0$</td>
<td>$\phi \ell &lt; \phi \ell$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type-II</td>
<td>$\gamma &gt; \gamma_3$</td>
<td>$\lambda_\Phi = 0$</td>
<td>$\lambda_s &gt; 0$</td>
<td>$\phi \ell &lt; \phi \ell$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 Appendix III: Pricing mechanisms

The derivation of the terms of trade using the Nash bargaining approach is today a standard practice in Lagos-Wright-type models. In recent years, however, other pricing mechanisms such as Kalai bargaining and competitive pricing have received attention.

Kalai bargaining. Unlike the Nash bargaining solution, the egalitarian solution proposed by Kalai (1977) is strong monotonic in the sense that no agent is made worse off from an expansion of the bargaining surplus. Because of this property, the Kalai solution has been increasingly used in monetary economics.\(^{20}\) The Kalai bargaining problem is to solve

$$ (q, z) = \arg \max u(q) - \phi z $$

s.t. $u(q) - \phi z = \theta [u(q) - q]$ and $z \leq m$.

When the buyer’s cash constraint is binding, i.e., $m = z$, the solution to this problem is

$$ \phi m = g^K(q) = \theta q + (1 - \theta) u(q). \quad (51) $$

If $m = z$, the Kalai solution is different from the Nash solution, unless $\theta = 0$ or $\theta = 1$; if $z < m$, Nash bargaining and Kalai bargaining yield the same solution. In order to adapt the model to Kalai bargaining, we only need to replace $g(q)$ with $g^K(q)$, where the superscript $K$ stands for Kalai solution.

Competitive market. Assume competitive pricing in the goods market. Then, buyers and sellers do not bargain over the terms of trade. Instead, they take the price as given in this market.

Under competitive pricing, it is natural to interpret $\delta$ and $\delta^s$ as participation probabilities. In particular, let $\delta$ ($\delta^s$) be the probability that a buyer (seller) participates in the goods market. Then, the value function of a buyer at the opening of the goods market is

$$ V_2^b(m, \ell) = \delta \max_q \left[ u(q) + V_3(m - pq, \ell) \right]_{s.t. \ m \geq pq} + (1 - \delta) V_3(m, \ell), \quad (52) $$

\(^{20}\)One of the first papers to use the Kalai approach in Lagos-Wright-type models is Arouba, Rocheteau and Waller, (2007). Other applications that followed are Rocheteau and Wright (2010), Lester, Postlewaite and Wright (2012), He, Wright and Zhu (2012), and Trejos and Wright (2012).
where $p$ is the price, and $q$ the quantity of goods he consumes if he enters the goods market. The first-order condition to this problem is

$$u'(q) = p (\phi + \lambda_q),$$

(53)

where $\lambda_q$ denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the cash constraint, $m \geq pq$.

The seller’s value function at the opening of the goods market is

$$V_2^s(m, d) = \delta^s \max_{q_s} [-q_s + V_3(m + pq_s, d)] + (1 - \delta^s) V_3(m, d).$$

(54)

The first-order condition to this problem is

$$p \phi = 1.$$  

(55)

If $m > pq$, the buyer consumes the efficient quantity $q^*$, where $q^*$ solves $u'(q^*) = 1$. If $m = pq$, he spends all his money and consumes $q < q^*$. Note that, in equilibrium, an active buyer holds more money than a passive buyer. This means that $\lambda_q > \lambda_q$. It then follows that $\hat{q} > q$.

The buyer’s envelope conditions are

$$\frac{\partial V_2^b}{\partial m} = \phi \left[ \delta u'(q) + 1 - \delta \right] \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial V_2^b}{\partial \ell} = -\phi (1 + i),$$

(56)

where we have used (33), (53), and (55). Notice the similarity between (56) and (34). The two expressions are the same if $\theta = 1$.

The seller’s envelope conditions are exactly the same as (35); i.e., $\frac{\partial V_2^s}{\partial m} = \phi$, and $\frac{\partial V_2^s}{\partial d} = \phi (1 + i)$.

Using the buyer’s budget constraint at equality (i.e., $pq = m$) and (55) we obtain

$$\phi m = g^C(q) \equiv q,$$

(57)

where the superscript $C$ stands for competitive pricing.

Finally, note that under competitive pricing the goods market clearing condition holds, i.e.,

$$\delta(1 - n) [\pi \hat{q} + (1 - \pi)q] = \delta^s n q_s,$$

(58)

where $\hat{q} (q)$ is the quantity consumed by a buyer who has (has no) access to the money market.

12 Appendix IV: Data sources

The data we use for the calibration is provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (BGFRS), the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRBL), and the U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
As the time series of M1 adjusted for retail sweeps of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis is only available from 1967:Q1, we use the series M1SL as a measure of the M1 for the period from 1959:Q1 to 1966:Q4 and the series M1SA for the period from 1950:Q1 to 1958:Q4 (downloadable at http://research.stlouisfed.org/aggreg/). The definition that we apply to calculate the quarterly value of M1SA is in line with the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED® database and is defined as the average of the monthly data.

**References**


