Alexey Kushnir
My primary research interest lies in the domain of market and mechanism design. My PhD work largely focuses on the analysis of a signaling mechanism in decentralized two-sided markets. This endeavor shows that the introduction of signals facilitates match formation for a wide range of environments (see "Preference Signaling in Matching Markets" joint with Peter Coles and Muriel Niederle). Nevertheless, there are instances when signaling precludes match formation (see "Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets").
My recent research analyses some fundamental questions of mechanism design. In the recent paper "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation" joint with Alex Gershkov, Jacob Goeree, Benny Moldovanu, and Xianwen Shi (conditionally accepted in Econometrica) we establish the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for general social choice environments with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private values.
In the other paper "A Geometric Approach to Mechanism Design" joint with Jacob Goeree we exploit the duality between closed convex sets and their support functions, an important result in convex analysis, to develop a novel geometric approach to mechanism design. Most importantly, our approach allows a tractable analysis of generally complex incentives constraints. We show how the new approach can be applied to a wide range of social choice problems, including auctions, bargaining, and public goods provision.
