Iterated Structural Estimation of Gravity Models with Market-Entry Dynamics

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Abstract

The present paper develops a structural empirical general equilibrium model of aggregate bilateral trade with path dependence of country-pair-level exporting status. Such path dependence is motivated through informational costs about serving a foreign market for the first time versus continued export services to that market. We embed the theoretical model into a structural dynamic stochastic econometric model of bilateral selection into export markets and apply it to a data-set of aggregate bilateral exports among 120 countries over the period 1995-2004. In particular, we disentangle the role of changes in trade costs, in labor endowments, and in total factor productivity for trade, bilateral market entry, numbers of firms active, and welfare. Dynamic gains from trade differ significantly from static ones, and path-dependence in market entry cushions effects of impulses in fundamental variables that are detrimental to bilateral trade.

Keywords: Bilateral trade flows; Gravity equation; Dynamic random effects model; Sample selection

JEL codes: F10; F12; F17

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1 Introduction

Whether two countries trade with each other in a given year or not – often referred to as the extensive country margin of bilateral trade – can be explained with great success by their past export status. For a cross section of the major 120 countries in terms of their GDP over the time period 1995-2004, Table 1 suggests that 66% of the country pairs display positive bilateral exports when they did so 3 years prior to that, 20% have zero exports when they did not have any exports 3 years prior to that, and 13% change their activity within 3 years, on average. Moreover, 52% of the country pairs have positive bilateral exports in 2004 and they did so in 1995, 20% report zero exports in 2004 and they did not have any exports in 1995, and 28% changed their activity between 1995 and 2004. This evidence suggests that there is a strong role for persistence or path dependence to play both unconditional and, as we will show, conditional on exogenous determinants for the extensive margin of trade.

This paper delivers a structural empirical model which is capable of analyzing both the extensive and the intensive margin of aggregate bilateral goods trade with a path-dependent extensive margin of trade (e.g., due to learning of firms about fixed market-entry costs) in general equilibrium. In particular, the work by Evenett and Venables (2002), Albornoz, Calvo Pardo, Corcos, and Ornelas (2012), and others points to such path dependence at the extensive margin of trade. The model we propose is based on a dynamic model for bilateral selection into export markets and a demand equation for bilateral goods exports which are interrelated through deterministic and
stochastic components of the data-generating process. This model fully respects general equilibrium constraints at both margins of trade and, unlike earlier work, pursues an iterated estimation of a general-equilibrium consistent panel data model with dynamic selection into export markets.

By virtue of the chosen approach, the paper stands on the shoulders of previous research on structural modelling of bilateral trade flows. With the seminal papers of Eaton and Kortum (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), it became possible to infer empirically comparative static effects of determinants of bilateral trade flows consistently with general equilibrium. This enabled taking into account repercussions of changes of exogenous drivers of trade on endogenous product and, eventually, factor prices. Beyond earlier work, the structural models of Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) and Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo (2012) can explain zero trade flows and, hence, deliver answers to the question as to which extent trade responds to changes in fundamental variables through the extensive versus the intensive margins of bilateral trade (see Head and Mayer, 2014, for a survey.\footnote{This paper is mostly concerned with path dependence in the entry of markets at the aggregate bilateral level. Hence, it is only loosely related to recent work on the (static) determinants and effects of growth of product variety in new trade theory models along the lines of Broda and Weinstein (2006) and Feenstra and Kee (2008).}

A key feature of the aforementioned general equilibrium models is that they are designed for empirical cross-section analysis. Hence, they do not distinguish between short-run and long-run responses of outcome to changes in fundamental variables. In principle, it is of course possible to simply index
endogenous and exogenous variables by time and analyze empirically a series of cross sections. Yet, there is no salient role for history to play in the sense that, conditional on the contemporaneous exogenous variables, those cross sections would be independent of each other. Hence, the aforementioned theoretical work suggests that the analysis of panel data on bilateral trade matrices can be performed for each period separately without any loss of insight.

In line with recent structural empirical work on aggregate bilateral trade flows, we model nominal bilateral goods trade as a function of an exporting country’s supply potential, an importing country’s demand potential, and trade barriers. As in Melitz (2003), Chaney (2005), or Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), the latter contain elements which are tied to the quantity of goods shipped (variable trade costs) and ones that entail fixed export-market access costs (fixed trade costs). Apart from contemporaneous fundamentals, we allow the extensive margin of bilateral trade to depend on bilateral export status prior to a given point in time. For instance, this is consistent with firms’ entering a market to generate information about that market as a public good which is available to suppliers from the same origin to that market in subsequent periods. This leads to a dynamic model of export-market selection which is stochastically related to export demand at the intensive country margin.

We formulate a deterministic and a stochastic version of that model and apply it to data on bilateral aggregate exports of the aforementioned 120 countries in three-year intervals between 1995 and 2004. Our goal is to identify the main drivers of world trade for that period, which in the context
of the model are (fixed and variable) trade costs, labor endowments, and productivity. In particular, we shed light on the short-run and the long-run responses – and, hence, of path-dependence – of trade in general equilibrium to the changes of these fundamentals. We do so in a fully nonlinear model. Our findings suggest that the average three-year change in (fixed and variable) trade costs – a reduction thereof – per country pair between 1995 and 2004 triggered positive short-run and long-run effects on nominal bilateral exports. Increases in labor endowments and total factor productivity raised bilateral exports even more strongly in both the short run and the long run.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section formulates a parsimonious model with path-dependent export-market entry. While we chose a model which is closest to Krugman’s (1979), such a framework could easily be cast in the context of theoretical models à la Anderson (1979), Eaton and Kortum (2002), or Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). Section 3 embeds this model in a stochastic framework for dynamic selection into export markets and aggregate export demand. Also, that section provides details about the implementation of such a model for parameter estimation and counterfactual analysis. Section 4 describes features of the data-set of 120 countries and three-year intervals for 1995-2004 we apply this model to, and it summarizes estimation results. Section 5 describes the find-

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2In a different context, Baier and Bergstrand (2001) have asked a related question in a non-structural model with tariffs, non-tariff trade costs, and GDP growth as the main drivers of trade in a static model. They found that 67% of total growth of trade flows for 16 OECD countries over 1958-1960 and 1986-1988 could be explained by GDP growth, 26% by tariff reductions, and 8% by changes in non-tariff trade costs. Hence, the lion’s share is attributed to GDP growth, the latter being exogenous there but endogenous in general equilibrium models of trade and itself a function of tariffs and trade costs among other factors (such as total factor productivity and factor endowments).
ings about the short-run (three-year) and long-run (thirteen-year) effects of changes in drivers of trade flows as observed over the period 1995-2004. The last section concludes with a summary of the most important findings.

2 An aggregate gravity model with path-dependent market entry

Consider a world with $J$ countries indexed by $j = 1, ..., J$ and consumers with a love for variety for goods consumption in a single sector à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1979). It will be useful to introduce a time index and set out that model for two periods, say $t$ and $t-1$. It suffices to focus mostly on the exposition of the model for period $t$, but, as will become clear below, the equilibrium in $t$ will depend on the export status (of firms) of country $i$ with $j$ in period $t-1$. Let us assume that all varieties – of which each firm produces a unique one – in country $i$ and period $t$ are produced by using one factor of production, labor, at unit input costs of $w_{it} a_{it}$, where $w_{it}$ denotes the wage rate and $a_{it}$ the corresponding input coefficient (inverse labor or total factor productivity). Then, monopolistic competition and the absence of pricing to consumer markets by firms implies mark-up pricing
with mill price\(^3\)

\[ p_{it} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_{it} a_{it}, \quad (1) \]

where \( \sigma > 1 \) is the (time-invariant) elasticity of substitution between varieties. An important consequence of the assumption of homogeneous technologies within countries is that, through (1), all firms in country \( i \) – of which there is a mass \( n_{it} \) in period \( t \) – behave in the same way so that we can write utility-maximizing demand in \( j \) for an \( i \)-borne variety in period \( t \), \( c_{ijt} \), and the price index for the consumer basket in \( j \) and year \( t \), \( P_{jt} \), respectively, as

\[ c_{ijt} = \frac{p_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}}{P_{jt}^{1-\sigma}} Y_{jt}, \quad P_{jt}^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{i=1}^{J} n_{it} p_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} V_{ijt}, \quad (2) \]

where \( p_{ijt} \geq p_{it} \) is the consumer price per unit of \( c_{ijt} \), \( Y_{jt} \) is income (GDP) equalling aggregate expenditures in country \( j \) in that period, and \( V_{ijt} \) is an indicator variable which is unity, if \( i \)-borne varieties are sold at market \( j \) in \( t \) and zero otherwise.

The varieties are assumed to be internationally tradable, but importing

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\(^3\)Notice that the chosen approach follows closely Krugman’s (1979) and Redding and Venables’ (2004) framework. Alternatively, one could allow for heterogeneous firms by assuming a fixed distribution of total factor productivity as in Melitz (2003) or Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). The latter approach would support comparative static results for trade costs which run through an additional channel, namely adjustment of the export-market-specific lower cut-off level of productivity of active producers. While the latter may be important to consider for an analysis at the level of firms or individual sectors (see Das, Roberts, and Tybout, 2007; Kee and Krishna, 2008; Cherkashin, Demidova, Kee, and Krishna, 2010; for examples), selection-induced productivity effects tend to be negligible in estimated general equilibrium models at the aggregate (country) level (see Egger, Larch, Staub, and Winkelmann, 2011). The model with homogeneous firms considered here may be viewed as to result from the models of Melitz (2003) or Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) as a limiting case. If the support of the distribution of the productivity parameter converges to zero, firms’ labor productivity parameters become homogenous and all firms located in a country become symmetric. We suppress the less parsimonious outline for a model with heterogeneous firms, here, for the sake of brevity.
is subject to variable, iceberg-type transportation costs of $\tau_{ijt} \geq 1$, so that $p_{ijt} = p_{it}\tau_{ijt}$. We will assume below that $\tau_{ijt}$ also includes tariffs. Notice that $p_{ijt}$ applies to exports which are measured inclusive of cost, insurance, and freight. Moreover, we follow Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) in assuming that a firm’s profits are additively separable into market-specific profits. Operating a firm and selling at a market involves two types of fixed costs. First, the manager of a firm decides upon consumer (or export) market entry conditional on attainable market-specific operating profits and market-specific fixed costs per period there. This determines whether a firm, conditional on operating at all, will sell in a specific consumer market at a specific time or not. Second, there are fixed costs which are specific to the firm and a time period but not a market. In order for the firm to operate at all, the sum of hypothetical market-specific operating profits net of market-specific fixed costs must be non-negative.

With respect to consumer-market-specific fixed trade costs, suppose $i$-borne firms did not deliver goods to market $j$ in period $t - 1$ but they start doing so in period $t$. Let us denote the sum of set-up and maintenance fixed costs per $i$-borne firm for serving market $j$ for the first time in $t$ by $w_{it} f_{ijt}$, where $f_{ijt}$ measures the units of labor used for set-up and maintenance.\footnote{To avoid complicated dynamics at the firm level which are not observable in aggregate data for multiple countries, we assume that each firm lives one period only (see Cherkashin, Demidova, Kee, and Krishna, 2010, for a similar assumption). However, there is a dynamic process of aggregate market entry in each period accruing to new firms’ inheritance of public knowledge about exports markets from previous periods by previous exporters.} To capture path dependence through, e.g., the generation of information about a market as a public good for firms from the same exporting country, in a very parsimonious way, assume that prior exporting (in $t - 1$) of any $i$-borne firm
to that market results in proportionately lower fixed costs of \( w_{it} f_{ijt} e^{-\delta} \) with \( \delta \geq 0 \) (see Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003, for an early argument along those lines). Then, fixed costs of \( i \)-borne firms from serving market \( j \) in year \( t \) may be written as \( w_{it} f_{ijt} e^{-\delta V_{ij,t-1}} \), where \( V_{ij,t-1} = 1 \) if market \( j \) had been served by \( i \)-borne firms in the previous period and zero else. Most importantly, the presence of \( e^{-\delta V_{ij,t-1}} \) in the fixed costs entails state-dependence in export status at the country-pair level.\(^5\) We generally assume that \( V_{ij,t-1} = 1 \) if \( i = j \); i.e., \( f_{it} \) is small enough to ensure that active firms always serve consumers at least in the country they produce in at any period \( t \).\(^6\)

In equilibrium for positive (hypothetical) exports, bilateral shipments per variety, \( x_{ijt} \), equal \( \tau_{ijt} \) times bilateral demand per variety, \( c_{ijt} \). Then, per-firm hypothetical shipments gross of cost, insurance, and freight (cif), \( x_{ijt} \), and the corresponding value of aggregate bilateral exports, \( X_{ijt} \), are determined as

\[
x_{ijt} = \tau_{ijt} c_{ijt} V_{ijt} = \frac{P_{it}^{1-\sigma} \tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}}{P_{jt}^{1-\sigma}} Y_{jt} V_{ijt},
\]

\[
X_{ijt} = n_{it} P_{it} x_{ijt} = n_{it} \left( \frac{P_{it}^{1-\sigma} \tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}}{P_{jt}^{1-\sigma}} \right) Y_{jt} V_{ijt}.
\]

Following Melitz (2003), free entry of firms implies that global profits (i.e.,

\(^5\)It is straightforward to allow for a more flexible cost function with a more general pattern of path dependence such as \( w_{it} f_{ijt} e^{-\sum_{d=1}^{D} \delta_{d} V_{ij,t-d}} \). However, in the application below there is too much multicollinearity across the \( V_{ij,t-d} \) so that identification of the individual parameters \( \delta_{d} \) is only possible with \( D = 1 \). Hence, we abstain from overburdening the model unnecessarily with notation.

\(^6\)We also assume throughout that the costs of entering foreign countries are low enough so that it pays off for firms to export somewhere abroad and to consumers in every country to import some varieties, in line with empirical stylized facts. When bringing the model to the data, this outcome arises endogenously, consistent with those facts.
the sum of consumer market-specific profits) exactly equate to the fixed costs of operating a firm. Market-\(j\)-specific profits of \(i\)-borne firms in period \(t\) contribute to global profits and have to be non-negative for this market to be served. Using (1) and (3) firm-specific profits in market \(j\) may be written as

\[
\pi_{ijt} = \frac{w_{it}a_{it}x_{ijt}}{\sigma - 1} - w_{it}f_{ijt}e^{-\delta V_{ij,t-1}}.
\]  
(5)

Non-negative profits in (5) suggest that \(x_{ijt} \geq x_{ijt}^* \equiv \frac{f_{ijt}e^{-\delta V_{ij,t-1}}}{a_{it}}(\sigma - 1)\).

Hence, \(i\)-borne firms will only start exporting to \(j\) in \(t\), if \(\tau_{ijt}c_{ijt} \geq \frac{f_{ijt}}{a_{it}}(\sigma - 1)\) and, in case of prior exports between \(i\) and \(j\), \(i\)-borne firms will only continue exporting to \(j\), if \(\tau_{ijt}c_{ijt} \geq \frac{f_{ijt}e^{-\delta}}{a_{it}}(\sigma - 1)\). Free entry then implies the firm-specific zero profit (entry) condition

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{J} \pi_{ijt} = w_{it}f_{e,t},
\]  
(6)

where \(f_{e,t}\) are the fixed costs of running a firm. We denote the aggregate endowment with labor of country \(i\) at time \(t\) by \(L_{it}\). Assuming full employment, the labor constraint is given by

\[
L_{it} = n_{it} \left( f_{e,t} + \sum_{j=1}^{J} V_{ijt} \left( a_{it}x_{ijt} + e^{-\delta V_{ij,t-1}}f_{ijt} \right) \right),
\]  
(7)

where \(\sum_{j=1}^{J} V_{ijt}a_{it}x_{ijt}\) is the variable amount of labor used for production, \(\sum_{j=1}^{J} (V_{ijt}e^{-\delta V_{ij,t-1}}f_{ijt})\) is the fixed amount of labor used for establishing or

\text{Notice that the labor constraint is vital in order to establish a relationship between the efficiency costs of production factors, } w_{it} \text{ and GDP, } Y_{it}. \text{ For instance, Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) do not introduce such a constraint. Therefore, their model is not fit for comparative static analysis, where both counterfactual (indicated by superscript } C \text{) } w_{it}^C \text{ and } Y_{it}^C \text{ are unknown.}
maintaining market-specific business contacts in $\sum_{j=1}^{J} V_{ijt} \leq J$ markets, and $f_{e,t}$ is the fixed amount of labor used to operate a firm in period $t$.

Inserting potential profits in market $j$ given in (5), the zero profit condition (6) can be rewritten as

$$\sum_{j=1}^{J} V_{ijt} a_{it} x_{ijt} = (\sigma - 1) \left( f_{e,t} + \sum_{j=1}^{J} V_{ijt} f_{ijt} e^{-\delta V_{ij,t-1}} \right), \quad \text{(8)}$$

and one can express the labor constraint as

$$L_{it} = \sigma n_i \left( f_{e,t} + \sum_{j=1}^{J} V_{ijt} f_{ijt} e^{-\delta V_{ij,t-1}} \right). \quad \text{(9)}$$

In equilibrium, the labor constraint (9) and the zero profit condition (6) thus determine the number of firms active in country $i$ at time $t$:

$$n_{it} = \frac{L_{it}}{\sigma \left( f_{e,t} + \sum_{j=1}^{J} V_{ijt} f_{ijt} e^{-\delta V_{ij,t-1}} \right)}. \quad \text{(10)}$$

Since, conditional on firm entry, market $j$ is only served in $t$ by $i$-borne firms if this involves non-negative profits, we may introduce a latent variable $V_{ijt}^*$ that reflects aggregate potentially realizable profits of firms in $i$ for serving consumers in $j$ in period $t$ as in (5):

$$V_{ijt}^* = \frac{w_{it} a_{it} x_{ijt}}{(\sigma - 1) w_{it} f_{ijt} e^{-\delta V_{ij,t-1}}} \geq 1, \quad \text{or} \quad \text{(11)}$$

$$\tilde{V}_{ijt}^* = \frac{V_{ijt}^*}{\tilde{V}_{it}^*} = \frac{\tau_{ijt}^{-\sigma} Y_{jt} P_{jt}^{\sigma-1}}{\tau_{stit}^{-\sigma} Y_{it} P_{it}^{\sigma-1}} e^{-\delta f_{ijt}} \geq 1. \quad \text{(12)}$$

Since $V_{it}^* \geq 1$ by both assumption and observation (consumption from do-
mestic producers is generally positive at the aggregate level), both $V_{ijt}$ and $\tilde{V}_{ijt}$ generate the same indicator variable $V_{ijt}$ according to

$$V_{ijt} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \ln \tilde{V}_{ijt} \geq 0 \\ 0 & \text{else.} \end{cases}$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)$$

In general equilibrium, total sales to all markets at cif add up to GDP, $Y_{it}$, plus tariff revenues earned by $i$ minus tariff revenues collected abroad from $i$’s exports, $T_{it}$, so that

$$\tilde{Y}_{it} \equiv Y_{it} + T_{it} = \sum_{h=1}^{J} X_{ih} = n_{it} p_{it}^{1-\sigma} \sum_{h=1}^{J} V_{ih} \left( \frac{\tau_{ih}}{P_{ht}} \right)^{1-\sigma} Y_{ht}. \hspace{1cm} (14)$$

After defining $Y_t \equiv \sum_{h=1}^{J} Y_{ht}$, $\theta_{it} \equiv Y_{it}/Y_t$, $\bar{\theta}_{it} \equiv \tilde{Y}_{it}/Y_t = \theta_{it} Y_{it}/Y_t = \theta_{it} + T_{it}/Y_t$, and $\Pi_{it}^{1-\sigma} \equiv \sum_{h=1}^{J} V_{ih} \left( \frac{\tau_{ih}}{P_{ht}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \theta_{ht}$, similar to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Anderson (2010), we obtain

$$\tilde{Y}_{it} = n_{it} p_{it}^{1-\sigma} Y_{t} \Pi_{it}^{1-\sigma} \Rightarrow n_{it} p_{it}^{1-\sigma} = \bar{\theta}_{it} \Pi_{it}^{1-\sigma}. \hspace{1cm} (15)$$

The latter expressions illustrate that the adopted version of a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) or Krugman (1979) model is isomorphic to the one of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Replacing $n_{it} p_{it}^{1-\sigma}$ by the expression in (15) and $Y_{jt}$ by $Y_{t} \theta_{jt}$ in (4) and recalling the definition of $P_{jt}^{1-\sigma}$ from (2), the generalized system of trade resistance equations à la Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) with possible zero trade flows and tariffs is given by

$$\Pi_{it}^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{h=1}^{J} V_{ih} \tau_{ih}^{1-\sigma} P_{ht}^{\sigma-1} \theta_{ht}, \quad P_{jt}^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{h=1}^{J} V_{hjt} \tau_{hjt}^{1-\sigma} \Pi_{ht}^{\sigma-1} \bar{\theta}_{ht}. \hspace{1cm} (16)$$
Defining $\mu_{it} \equiv \tilde{\theta}_{it} P_{it}^{\sigma-1}$ and $m_{jt} \equiv \theta_{jt} P_{jt}^{\sigma-1}$, we can rewrite aggregate nominal exports at cif from $i$ to $j$ in $t$ as

$$X_{ijt} = \mathcal{Y}_{t} r_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} V_{ijt} \mu_{it} m_{jt}, \quad \text{with}$$

$$\tilde{\theta}_{it} = \mu_{it} \sum_{h=1}^{J} V_{iht} r_{iht}^{1-\sigma} h_{ht}, \quad \theta_{jt} = m_{jt} \sum_{h=1}^{J} V_{hjt} r_{hjt}^{1-\sigma} h_{ht}.$$  \hfill (17)

A key assumption here is that firms consider the role of path dependence for market entry, but they do not look forward and equate the stream of future operating profits to the one of total (per-period and subsequently sunk entry) fixed costs when deciding about the timing of entry. When conditioning on observed fundamental variables and analyzing a model of the latter kind in general equilibrium, it turns out that, under certain assumptions, the estimation part of the problem is not much different from the problem with path dependence considered here: while past export status exhibits a constant effect $\delta$ on the latent process determining the extensive margin here, it may have a drift of the form $\delta t$, where $t$ represents a time trend. However, the counterfactual analysis is computationally extremely demanding with forward-looking managers and there are so many conceptual problems involved that this issue calls for a separate analysis focusing on counterfactuals rather than estimation.
3 From theory to an empirical model: Implementation and estimation

To derive an econometric specification of the above gravity model with panel data, we need to specify the stochastic processes that arise from measurement error about or random shocks on exports. Finally, we ought to comment on some issues with the implementation of the model.

3.1 Adding disturbances

Let us take logs of the gravity equation in (17) and add a log-additive stochastic term $u_{X,ijt}$ to obtain

$$\ln X_{ijt} = \begin{cases} 
\ln Y_t + \ln \tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} + \ln m_{it} + \ln \mu_{jt} + u_{X,ijt} & \text{if } V_{ijt} = 1 \\
\text{unobserved} & \text{if } V_{ijt} = 0
\end{cases}. \quad (19)$$

The trade-resistance terms $\ln \mu_{it}$ and $\ln m_{jt}$ are determined as implicit solutions to the system of $2J$ equations (18) in $2J$ unknowns $\mu_{it}$ and $m_{jt}$ for each period $t$ following from the requirement of multilaterally balanced trade for each economy.

The unobserved latent variable for the propensity to export from $i$ to $j$ in year $t$ based on (12) is log-transformed and augmented additively by the stochastic term $u_{V,ijt}$. Using $\frac{Y_{jt}^\sigma - 1}{Y_{it}^\sigma - 1} = \frac{m_{jt}}{m_{it}}$, it can be written as

$$\ln \tilde{V}_{ijt}^* = \ln \frac{\tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}}{\tau_{it}^{1-\sigma}} + \ln \frac{m_{jt}}{m_{it}} + \delta V_{ij,-1} + \ln \frac{f_{it}}{f_{ijt}} + u_{V,ijt}, \quad \text{with} \quad (20)$$

$$V_{ijt} = 1[\ln \tilde{V}_{ijt}^* \geq 0]. \quad (21)$$
We will talk about the assumptions regarding $u_{X,ijt}$ and $u_{V,ijt}$ in the next subsection. With respect to variable trade costs and fixed export market access costs, we assume

$$\ln \tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \ln \zeta_{k,ijt}, \quad \ln f_{ijt} = \sum_{l=1}^{L} \beta_l \ln \chi_{l,ijt},$$

where $\zeta_{k,ijt}$ and $\chi_{l,ijt}$ are variables related to variable and fixed trade costs, respectively. In practice, $K$ may equal $L$ and all factors determining $\ln \tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}$ may also affect $\ln f_{ijt}$. As long as the parameters $\alpha_k$ differ from the respective $\beta_l$, $\ln \tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}$ may still differ from $\ln f_{ijt}$, even if $\ln \zeta_{k,ijt} = \ln \chi_{l,ijt}$ for $k = l$.

It may be desirable for identification to include at least one other element $\ln \chi_{l,ijt}$ beyond the ones of $\ln \zeta_{k,ijt}$ in small samples, but in large samples as ours, there is no need for the fundamentals behind $\ln \tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}$ and $\ln f_{ijt}$ to differ at all.

Obviously, even in the absence of zero trade flows (i.e., $V_{ijt} = 1$ for all $ijt$) and at known $\sigma$, $Y_{it}$, and $\tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}$, the system in equation (18) could only be solved numerically. Notice that we fully respect cross-equation restrictions of parameters in the empirical models in (19)-(21).

3.2 Stochastic process and estimation

We specify the disturbances $u_{V,ijt}$ and $u_{X,ijt}$ in the models of $\tilde{V}_{ijt}^*$ in (20) and $\ln X_{ijt}$ in (19), respectively, as

$$u_{V,ijt} = \eta_{V,ij} + \lambda_{V,ij} V_{ij,0} + \epsilon_{V,ijt}$$

$$u_{X,ijt} = \eta_{X,ij} + \epsilon_{X,ijt},$$

where

$$\ln \tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \ln \zeta_{k,ijt}, \quad \ln f_{ijt} = \sum_{l=1}^{L} \beta_l \ln \chi_{l,ijt},$$

(22)
where $\eta_{V,ij}$ and $\eta_{X,ij}$ are time-invariant, country-pair-specific effects that are assumed to be uncorrelated with the other determinants of $\tilde{V}_{ijt}^*$ (including $V_{ij,0}$) and of $\ln X_{ijt}$, respectively. $\eta_{V,ij}$ and $\eta_{X,ij}$ are identically and independently distributed normal random effects which may be correlated with each other, and $\lambda_{V0}$ captures the (time-invariant) initial conditions, which are included to acknowledge the market-entry dynamics introduced before. Moreover, $\varepsilon_{V,ijt}$ and $\varepsilon_{X,ijt}$ are identically and independently distributed normal disturbances which may be correlated with each other but are independent of $\eta_{V,ij}$ and $\eta_{X,ij}$ and the other determinants of $\tilde{V}_{ijt}^*$ (including $V_{ij,0}$) and of $\ln X_{ijt}$.

Regarding the distribution of the disturbances, we assume specifically that $(\eta_{V,ij}, \eta_{X,ij}) \sim i.i.d. N(0, V_\eta)$ and $(\varepsilon_{V,ijt}, \varepsilon_{X,ijt}) \sim i.i.d. N(0, V_\varepsilon)$, where

\[
V_\eta = \begin{bmatrix}
\sigma_{V,\eta}^2 & \rho_{\eta} \sigma_{V,\eta} \sigma_{X,\eta} \\
\rho_{\eta} \sigma_{V,\eta} \sigma_{X,\eta} & \sigma_{X,\eta}^2
\end{bmatrix}, \quad V_\varepsilon = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & \rho_{\varepsilon} \sigma_{X,\varepsilon} \\
\rho_{\varepsilon} \sigma_{X,\varepsilon} & \sigma_{X,\varepsilon}^2
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

Since the variance of $\varepsilon_{V,ijt}$, the remainder disturbances in the extensive margin model, is not identified, we normalize it to unity without loss of generality.

\footnote{It would be possible to allow not only $u_{V,ijt}$ (as we do) but even $\eta_{V,ij}$ to be correlated with some of the determinants of $V_{ijt}^*$ and $\eta_{X,ij}$ with some of the determinants of $\ln X_{ijt}$. For instance, one could follow the so-called Mundlak-Chamberlain-Wooldridge device and include means of all determinants of $V_{ijt}^*$ and $\ln X_{ijt}$ in the respective equations across time in addition to the original variables in the model. However, as this requires enough time variation in the explanatory variables, that approach is infeasible with numerous time-invariant covariates (such as bilateral distance or common borders, etc.) whose coefficient estimates are vital to the counterfactual analysis of the model. Nevertheless, we will elaborate on this issue below in Subsection 4.3 when discussing the robustness of the estimation results. For now, we resort to the somewhat stronger assumption of $\eta_{V,ij}$ and $\eta_{X,ij}$ as well as $\varepsilon_{V,ijt}$ and $\varepsilon_{X,ijt}$ to be generally uncorrelated with other determinants of the extensive and the intensive margin of exports. Moreover, the findings of Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggest that, e.g., the endogeneity of trade regionalism is much less an issue in panel data models than in cross-section models.}
(see the upper left cell of $V_\varepsilon$). In that model, $\rho_\eta \neq 0$ and/or $\rho_\varepsilon \neq 0$ implies selection into export status, so that the stochastic process may be termed a generalized random effects sample selection model which allows for path-dependent aggregate bilateral export status.

For the sake of simplicity of the notation, let us collect the determinants of the indicator function $V_{ijt}$ (the extensive margin of aggregate bilateral exports) and of continuous $\ln X_{ijt}$ (the intensive margin of aggregate bilateral exports) for observation $ijt$ into the following vectors

$$w_{V,ijt} = \left[ \ln \frac{\zeta_1_{ijt}}{\zeta_1_{iit}}, ... , \ln \frac{\zeta_K_{ijt}}{\zeta_K_{iit}}, \ln \frac{m_{jt}}{m_{it}}, V_{ij,t-1}, \ln \chi_1_{ijt}, ..., \ln \chi_L_{ijt}, V_{ij,0}, 1 \right]$$

$$w_{X,ijt} = [\zeta_1_{ijt}, ..., \ln \zeta_K_{ijt}, \ln \mu_{it}, \ln m_{jt}, Y_t, 1],$$

where $V_{ij,0}$ is included by following Wooldridge (2005) in $w_{V,ijt}$ to model the initial condition of the dynamic process for the extensive margin (selection into export markets), and a constant is included at the end of both $w_{V,ijt}$ and $w_{X,ijt}$ for proper centering of the data. Taking into account the parametrization in (22), the parameter vectors corresponding to $w_{V,ijt}$ and $w_{X,ijt}$, respectively, are

$$\beta_V = [\alpha_1, ..., \alpha_K, 1, \delta, \beta_1, ..., \beta_L, \lambda V_0, \beta_0]$$

$$\beta_X = [\alpha_1, ..., \alpha_K, 1, 1, 1, \alpha_0],$$

where $\beta_0$ and $\alpha_0$ are the coefficients of the constants in the two models. Notice that, for counterfactual analysis, the coefficients on $\ln \frac{\zeta_1_{ijt}}{\zeta_1_{iit}}, ..., \ln \frac{\zeta_K_{ijt}}{\zeta_K_{iit}}$ in the specification of the latent process (20) underlying the extensive margin
of aggregate bilateral trade have to equal the ones on $\zeta_1,ijt, \ldots, \zeta_K,ijt$ in the specification of the intensive margin of exports (19). Moreover, general-equilibrium-consistent counterfactual analysis requires that the coefficients on $m_{ijt}$ in (20) as well as the ones on $\ln \mu_{ijt}, \ln m_{ijt},$ and $Y_t$ in (19) are unity each.

Then, we can write the models to be estimated as follows:

$$V_{ijt} = 1[\ln \tilde{V}_{ijt}^* = w_{V,ijt} \beta_V + \eta_{V,ijt} + \epsilon_{V,ijt} > 0]$$  \hspace{1cm} (29)

$$= 1[A_{ijt} + \eta_{V,ij} + \epsilon_{V,ijt} > 0]$$

$$\ln X_{ijt} = w_{X,ijt} \beta_X + \eta_{X,ijt} + \epsilon_{X,ijt}$$  \hspace{1cm} (30)

$$= B_{ijt} + \eta_{X,ij} + \epsilon_{X,ijt}.$$  

Recently, Raymond, Mohnen, Palm, and Schim van der Loeff (2007, 2010) analyzed such models which allow to test and correct for sample selection with a dynamic process.\(^9\) Following Wooldridge (2005) and Raymond, Mohnen, Palm, and Schim van der Loeff (2007, 2010), we specify the likelihood of country pair $ij$, starting in $t = 1$ conditional on the regressors in $w_{V,ijt}$ (including the initial conditions) and $w_{X,ijt}$ and integrate out the country-pair-specific

\(^9\)In contrast to sample selection models for panel data as, e.g., in Wooldridge (1995), this model permits accounting for state dependence in the selection equation for the extensive margin of exports. Unlike previously applied selection models for structural gravity equations, this model is applicable with panel data and allows entertaining the time variation in trade with path dependence at the extensive margin.
random effects $\eta_{V,ij}$ and $\eta_{X,ij}$ as

$$L_{ij} = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \prod_{t=1}^{T} L_{ijt} \phi(\eta_{V,ij}, \eta_{X,ij}) d\eta_{V,ij} d\eta_{X,ij}, \quad (31)$$

$$L_{ijt} = \prod_{t=1}^{T} \left\{ \Phi \left( -A_{ijt} - \eta_{V,ij} \right) \right\}^{1-V_{ijt}} \left[ \frac{1}{\sigma_{X,\varepsilon}} \phi \left( \frac{\ln X_{ijt} - B_{ijt} - \eta_{X,ij}}{\sigma_{X,\varepsilon}} \right) \right] \times \Phi \left( \frac{A_{it} + \eta_{V,ij} + \frac{\sigma_{\varepsilon}}{\sigma_{X,\varepsilon}} \left( \ln X_{ijt} - B_{ijt} - \eta_{X,ij} \right)}{\sqrt{1-\rho_{\varepsilon}}} \right) V_{ijt}, \quad (32)$$

where $\phi(\eta_{V,ij}, \eta_{X,ij})$ denotes the density of the bivariate normal of the random country-pair effects as defined above, and $\Phi(\cdot)$ and $\phi(\cdot)$ in the expression for $L_{ijt}$ denote the cumulative distribution function and the density, respectively, of the univariate normal distribution.

The likelihood in (31)-(32) can be numerically maximized to estimate the model parameters using a two-step Gauss-Hermite quadrature for integrating out the random country-pair effects (see Appendix 1 for details). For this, one chooses a (not too large) number of sample points. The procedure is computationally demanding, since, with a bivariate normal, the number of sample points implies a number of evaluation points of that number squared.

We use 49 evaluation points of the Hermite polynomial and a weight for each of them to approximate the density of the bivariate normal distribution in the likelihood function (see Appendix 1 for further details).

Overall, the model accounts for three types of instantaneous effects of increasing trade costs on bilateral trade flows similar to Eaton and Kortum (2002), Melitz (2003), Chaney (2008), or Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). First, there is a direct effect due to the adjustment at the intensive margin as in (30) through higher (variable) trade costs on consumer prices.
in the destination country. Second, higher (variable as well as fixed) trade costs, eventually, may lead to zero bilateral trade flows as captured by the extensive margin relationship in (29). Finally, these direct consequences of higher trade costs at the extensive and intensive margins cause multilateral effects through trade by virtue of the price index effects captured by (18).

In contrast to previous structural empirical work on bilateral trade flows, our model generates dynamic effects of changes in trade barriers through dynamic adjustment at the extensive margin of aggregate bilateral trade. In our empirical analysis, we aim at fleshing out the instantaneous versus the long-run effects of changes in country size versus trade costs on the extensive and intensive margin of trade and, taking general equilibrium feedback effects and implied parameter constraints in the model fully into account for both estimation and counterfactual analysis.

### 3.3 Iterative estimation of the structural gravity model

Since the trade flow $\ln X_{ijt}$ depends on the trade-resistance terms $\ln \mu_{it}$, $\ln m_{it}$, and $\ln m_{jt}$, which themselves depend on the estimated model parameter estimates, we use an iterative nested fixed point algorithm for parameter estimation, similar to that developed by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). See also Ackerberg, Geweke, and Hahn (2009) as well as Kim and Park (2010) for details. In the inner iteration loop, at given parameter estimates, we solve for the fixed point in the system of trade-resistance terms $\ln \mu_{it}$ and $\ln m_{jt}$.

---

As said before, by focusing on homogeneous firms within countries, we rule out effects of higher trade costs on average productivity of firms exporting from a given country to a specific destination country. However, previous evidence suggests that this effect is of minor importance in aggregate data (see Egger and Larch, 2011; Egger, Larch, Staub, and Winkelmann, 2011).
for all \(ijt\) and, given these solutions, the outer loop calculates the maximum likelihood estimates. The algorithm switches between the inner and the outer loop until convergence. This is similar to the Gauss algorithm employed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Su and Judd (2012) demonstrate that the iterative nested fixed point approach is numerically equivalent to restricted maximum likelihood estimation (a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, MPEC, in their terminology). More precisely, we use \(\theta_{it}\) and \(\theta_{jt}\) as starting values for \(\ln \mu_{it}\) and \(\ln m_{jt}\), respectively, for all \(it\) and \(jt\) in Step 1 and optimize (31) to obtain estimates of the elements of \(\beta_V\) and \(\beta_X\) as well as those of \(V_\eta\) and \(V_\varepsilon\). Then, we solve for all \(\ln \mu_{it}\) and \(\ln m_{it}\) from the \(2JT\) equations in (18) through a Newton procedure in Step 2. With the new values for all \(\ln \mu_{it}\) and \(\ln m_{it}\) at hand, one can proceed with the next ML-estimation step. We iterate Steps 1 and 2 until convergence to obtain theory-consistent parameter estimates from maximum likelihood estimation. With the chosen grid of 49 evaluation points (based on seven sample points) with a bivariate normal for the stochastic process, parameter estimation of a random effects model with dynamic sample selection and endogenous multilateral resistance terms takes roughly two days on a modern multi-core computer for a data-set as large as ours.
4 Data and estimation results

4.1 Data

The panel data set employed in this paper is based on three-year averages of bilateral exports among 120 countries in five periods (see Appendix 2 for a list of countries by continent): 1992 (t = 0), 1995 (t = 1), 1998 (t = 2), 2001 (t = 3), 2004 (t = 4). We use three-year intervals so as to keep the number of time periods, T, small enough, since maximum likelihood estimation of the stochastic model is computationally quite demanding. Both $X_{ijt}$ and $V_{ijt}$ are based on nominal aggregate bilateral export flows in current US dollars as published in the United Nations’ COMTRADE database. Figures on exporter and importer nominal GDP in current US dollars for the respective years come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

Furthermore, we employ three types of trade barriers. First of all, we use average (trade-weighted) applied bilateral tariffs information about which is available from the World Bank’s WITS Database. Since the source data on weighted tariffs exhibit a large number of missing values, we interpolated and imputed missing tariff data using exogenous predictors (see Appendix 3 for details). Such a procedure (and even trade weighting alone) naturally leads to measurement error, so we follow Wansbeek and Meijer (2000, p. 29) and construct indicator variables so as to capture quantiles of the distribution of tariffs. Using a rough approximation of the distribution of measurement error-prone tariff data, e.g., from trade weighting or imputation, through discrete variables is a valid alternative to instrumental variables estimation to handle the measurement error (see Wansbeek and Meijer, 2000). More specif-
ically, we generate five indicator variables, which are associated with quintiles of the imputed tariff levels. We use zero tariff rates (as charged within deep preferential trade agreements such as customs unions or free trade areas) as the base which fully captures preferential trade agreement membership. In this way we are able to obtain a maximum coverage of countries and time periods, which is a prerequisite for both sample selection model estimation and solution for endogenous terms $\mu_{it}$ and $m_{jt}$ in (18) consistent with world-trade general equilibrium. Second, we use trade cost measures which are related to geographical distance between countries from the Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales’ Geographical Database. In particular, we use bilateral distance (in kilometers) between economies’ economic centers and an indicator reflecting common land borders between countries from that source. Third, we employ measures of cultural distance in terms of a common official language indicator variable, past colonial relationship, and a common colonizer indicator variable from that source.

Denote average applied bilateral tariff levels charged by country $j$ on varieties from $i$ in year $t$ in quintile $\kappa = 2, \ldots, 5$ by $1 \geq (b_\kappa - 1) \geq 0$. Average applied bilateral tariff levels in percent are $100(b_\kappa - 1)$, and they amount to 2.96%, 7.07%, 11.62%, and 21.42%, in the second, third, fourth, and fifth quintile, respectively, of the distribution in the average year $t$. This information is important for interpretation of the parameter estimates. We choose a notation so that $\zeta_2, \ldots, \zeta_5$ (e.g., in Table 4 below) correspond to quintile indicators for the second to the fifth quintile. Given that tariffs in the lowest quintile are captured by $b_1 = 1$, the estimated coefficients $\hat{\alpha}_2, \ldots, \hat{\alpha}_5$ on the indicators $\zeta_2, \ldots, \zeta_5$ can be interpreted as follows: $\hat{\alpha}_\kappa = -\hat{\sigma} \ln b_\kappa$ for $\kappa =$
2, ..., 5 so that \( \tilde{\sigma} = \frac{\tilde{\alpha}}{\ln b} \). Hence, the model principally permits estimation of \( \sigma \).

Table 2 summarizes features of the data on nominal exports in logs GDP, and the geographical (bilateral distance in logs and a non-contiguity binary indicator), cultural (binary indicator variables on no common language, no past colonial relationships between exporter and importer, and the two countries not having had a common colonizer), and political trade barriers (quintiles for tariff rates). While the bloc on the left-hand side of Table 2 provides information on average levels of these variables over the information period and their standard deviation, the bloc on the right-hand side provides average three-year changes for the time-variant subset of variables (i.e., except for the geographical and cultural indicators).

According to Table 2, about 21% of the observations fall into the lowest and as many into the highest quintile of the tariff distribution (zero tariffs), while about 20%, 19%, and 19% of the observations fall into the second, third, and the fourth quintile, respectively. The allocation of observations across quintiles is not exactly identical to 20% due to characteristics of the

\[ \text{24} \]
distribution of tariffs. In the average three-year period, more than 4% of the observations enter the lowest quintile of tariffs (from wherever) and slightly more than 1% enter the second quintile. Anyone of the upper three quintiles looses observations in the average three-year period between 1992 and 2004. The majority of observations does neither have a common land border or a common language, nor a common colonizer in the past. More than 60% of the country pairs did have positive exports in 1989. In the average period, about 72% of the country pairs had positive bilateral exports and about 70% of the country pairs saw positive bilateral exports three years earlier.

In terms of the notation in the previous section, we have up to \( K = L = 10 \) elements \( \alpha_k \ln \zeta_{k,ijt} \) for \( k = 1, \ldots, 10 \) in \( \ln \tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} \) and \( \beta_l \ln \chi_{l,ijt} \) for \( l = 1, \ldots, 10 \) in \( \ln f_{ijt} \), namely the aforementioned tariff, geographical, and cultural barriers which determine \( \ln \tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} \) and \( \ln f_{ijt} \), respectively. Recall that we impose the restriction that the estimate of \( \ln \tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} \) is identical between the extensive (\( \ln \tilde{V}_{ijt} \)) and intensive-margin equations (\( \ln X_{ijt} \)), but the inclusion of \( \ln f_{ijt} \) along with \( \ln \tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} \) in the extensive country margin model allows for identification of the parameters \( \beta_l \) apart from \( \alpha_k \).

4.2 Estimation results

In this subsection, we summarize the estimation results of dynamic selection models for the fully non-linear model as introduced in the previous sections as well as a model without status dependence as a reference. In any case, the parameters have to be estimated iteratively, since the multilateral resistance terms in (18) depend on the endogenous export status indicator \( V_{ijt} \).
Table 3 summarizes parameter estimates and their standard errors for four models (labelled A to D) each. In a vertical dimension, the table exhibits two blocks, where the one at the top refers to the extensive country margin as in equation (29), and the one at the bottom refers to the intensive country margin as in equation (30). All models are based on the fully nonlinear model involving implicit solutions to (18) at every step of the maximum likelihood estimation.

Model A is the reference model that ignores state dependence, and models B and C allow the stochastic terms to be correlated across the extensive- and intensive-margin models and, therefore account for sample selection. While Model B assumes bivariate normality so that dependence can be captured by an inverse Mills’ ratio as outlined in Section 3.2, Model C is a semi-parametric counterpart. The latter model replaces the inverse Mills’ ratio in the outcome equation by a third-order polynomial of the linear prediction of the extensive margin model (i.e., of \( \ln \tilde{V}_{ijt}^* \)). Conditional on the polynomial function, the stochastic terms between the two equations are assumed to be independent. We suppress the coefficients of the polynomial function but note that they are jointly significant at one percent with the data at hand. Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) interpret such a model as to control for both endogenous selection into export markets and firm heterogeneity within countries (in our case, average productivity of firms in \( i \) that serve market \( j \) in year \( t \)).\footnote{This interpretation involves many more assumptions than homogeneous firm models do. For instance, one has to specify the distribution function for firm productivity and the boundaries of the support region of possible productivity draws (inter alia, one needs to take a stance whether this support region is the same across countries or not; for instance, identical potential productivity support across all countries is assumed in...} Unlike in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008),
the (here, dynamic panel) selection equation and the outcome equation have to be estimated simultaneously rather than in two steps. Hence, maximum likelihood estimation has to be carried out iteratively until convergence, since the predictions of the control function change as the parameters of the models change.

Model D assumes that there is no endogenous selection into the extensive margin of trade and conditions on the indicator $V_{ijt}$ in the intensive margin outcome model as an exogenous variable. Hence, $V_{ijt}$ in the intensive-margin equation for $\ln X_{ijt}$ is not treated as a Bernoulli response variable based on $\tilde{V}_{ijt}^*$, unlike in Models A, B, and C. Accordingly, the parameters of the latent process $\tilde{V}_{ijt}^*$ are not estimated in these models but the multilateral resistance terms in (18) are solved by conditioning on the observed contemporaneously bilateral export status $V_{ijt}$. We consider Model B to be the preferred reference case, while the other models are inferior due to assumptions made with regard to the counterfactual analysis (Model C), the lack of state dependence (Model A), or the endogeneity bias (Model D).

Due to the parameter restrictions imposed, the estimates of $\alpha_k$ are identical for all determinants of $\ln \tau_{ijk}^{1-\sigma}$ in either equation within a model. However,
we assume that the same variables affect $\ln \tau_{ijt}^{-\sigma}$ and $\ln f_{ijt}$ so that $K = L$ and $\ln \zeta_{k,ijt} = \ln \chi_{l,ijt}$ for all $k = l$, but $\alpha_k$ may differ from $\beta_l$. For the sake of brevity, we therefore always report parameter estimates for $\alpha_{k,ijt} + \beta_{k,ijt}$ in the extensive margin models, since they refer to the same fundamental trade cost variables. Moreover, only the extensive-margin equation includes (endogenous) $V_{ij,t-1}$ and $V_{ij,0}$ and, hence, delivers parameter estimates for $\delta$ and $\lambda_{V0}$, respectively.

For the selection equations, we assess the goodness of fit by Matthew’s (1975) correlation coefficient (MCC). The latter is based on a cross tabulation of $V_{ijt}$ and $\hat{V}_{ijt}$ and it is related to the $\chi^2$-statistic for a $2 \times 2$ contingency table by $|MCC| = \sqrt{\frac{\chi^2}{N}}$, where $N$ is the number of observations. For log positive export flows at the intensive margin, we measure the goodness of fit by the correlation between the observed and predicted values. Table 3 shows that for the former, we obtain an MCC of 0.520 and 0.593. With respect to the latter, the fit is quite similar across the estimated models, amounting to 0.744, 0.744, 0.743, and 0.740 for Models A-D, respectively.\footnote{We would like to emphasize that the results for Models B and C are quite similar and even those for Model B and D compare closely. For instance, the correlation coefficient of $\ln \hat{\mu}_{ijt} + \ln \hat{m}_{ijt}$ between Models B and C is 0.982 and the one for Models B and D is 0.996. These high correlation coefficients suggest that the estimated multilateral resistance terms are quite similar across the estimated models. The same holds true for estimated $\ln X_{ijt}$ at $V_{ijt} = 1$ where the correlation coefficient between Models B and C amounts to 0.977 and the one between Models B and D amounts to 0.997. The correlation coefficient for the predicted $V_{ijt}$ between Models B and C amounts to 0.932. $V_{ijt}$ is taken as given in Model D and we know from Table 3 that the correlation coefficients between observed and predicted $V_{ijt}$ in Models A and B amount to 0.520 and 0.593, respectively. Obviously, a disadvantage of Model D is that counterfactual experiments may not display an impact of changes in fundamentals on $V_{ijt}$, since the latter is fixed to the observed value which is inconsistent with general equilibrium.}

– Table 3 –
The estimation results in Table 3 suggest the following conclusions. First, the positive and highly significant coefficient of previous exporting clearly points to the importance of dynamics and path dependence at the extensive margin of bilateral exports. In contrast, Model A that ignores state dependence in the selection equation leads to quite different parameter estimates of the selection equation. From Model B, we estimate the impact of knowledge-creation through first market entry for subsequent exporters to that market at a fixed-cost reduction of about $100 \cdot e^{0.431} - 100 \approx 53.87\%$. Hence, dynamic market entry plays a role beyond contemporaneous (or conditional on) fundamentals so that static model results would be misleading. The parameter estimates in the semiparametric selection Model C are comparable to their parametric counterparts in Model B. Finally, the point estimates and standard errors on $\rho_\eta$ and $\rho_\varepsilon$ – i.e., correlation of the disturbances between the processes of $\tilde{V}_{ijt}^*$ and $\ln X_{ijt}$ – suggests that contemporaneous export status $V_{ijt}$ should not be treated as exogenous (as in Model D) but as a Bernoulli response variable (as in the other models).

Regarding the role of variable trade costs for the extensive and the intensive margin, we find that all elements of $\ln \tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}$ display negative parameters ($\alpha_k$) which are highly significantly different from zero in Model B. Hence, variable trade barriers of any kind specified deter both the probability to export at all for country pairs and, at $V_{ijt} = 1$, the volume of bilateral exports.
4.3 Robustness of the estimation results

Table 3 also reports additional estimation results to assess the robustness of the preferred model involving two issues. First, we re-estimated Model B allowing for autocorrelation in the disturbances $\varepsilon_{V_{ijt}}$ and $\varepsilon_{X_{ijt}}$ to see whether the estimated coefficient on $V_{ijt-1}$ was actually capturing state dependence or arises spuriously due to autocorrelated shocks (Model E). Accounting for autocorrelation complicates the estimation procedure considerably as it is not possible to use quadrature methods to integrate out the country-pair-specific random effects. Instead we have to rely simulated-maximum-likelihood estimation. In particular, we check the validity of Model B as estimated in the outer iteration of the restricted maximum likelihood maximization using the implied resistance terms $(\mu_i, m_j)$ of the final estimates of Model B reported in Table 3. However, we do not solve the trade-resistance equations again (inner loop) in this case as this would involve an enormous additional computational burden.

The econometric method follows the two-step approach of Yen (2005) and, especially, Tauchmann (2010). The autocorrelated error terms imply a complicated correlation structure between the disturbances of the selection model and the gravity outcome model so that the proposed panel Heckman-type sample selection model is no longer applicable. Instead, we estimate a dynamic panel probit model with autocorrelated errors in the first stage, using the simulated maximum likelihood estimator similar to the one applied in Stewart (2006). Based on the first-stage parameter estimates, we calculate the Mills’ ratios following Tauchman (2010) conditioning the distribution of
the outcome on the whole sequence of the country pairs’ export status. Since we have four periods in the outcome model, four (generalized) Mills’ ratios enter this equation each with a time-specific parameter. To account for the induced heteroskedasticity and possible autocorrelation of the disturbances in the second stage we use a panel bootstrap to calculate the standard errors. The corresponding estimates are summarized as Model E in Table 3. These estimation results indicate a negative, but relatively small estimated autocorrelation coefficient. The estimated parameter on $V_{ijt-1}$ remains highly significant but is higher than in Model B, while the impact of the initial export status is smaller. Overall, these estimates confirm the the importance of state dependence in the selection of country pairs into export status.

Second, the conditional distribution of the random effects may additionally depend on explanatory variables not considered in Model B, as it mainly contains time-invariant variables on trade barriers. We elaborate on this issue and re-estimate the preferred Model B using the Mundlak-Chamberlain-Wooldridge device. For this, we include two additional time-invariant counterparts to time-variant explanatory variables the Probit equation, namely

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \ln \frac{m_{it}}{m_{jt}}$$

(i.e., time-averaged relative importer resistance terms) and the estimate of the average bilateral tariff rate as

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \zeta_{k,ijt} \tau_{k,ijt},$$

where $\zeta_{k,ijt}$ ($k = 1, \ldots, 5$) refers to the binary indicator variable for the $k$th quintile of the tariff rate and $\tau_{k,ijt}$ to the respective average tariff rate in that quintile. This latter variable serves as a proxy of time invariant country specific average tariff rates as we use time varying dummies for each quintile of the observed tariffs to avoid severe measurement errors, and it also enters the gravity
equation. The results are summarized in Model F of Table 3 and show that these two additional variables are highly significant. Yet, the main estimation results of Model B remain valid, suggesting a low degree of collinearity between the additional regressors and the ones included in Model B.

5 Counterfactual analysis

5.1 Preliminaries

Based on (7)-(10) and (17)-(18), we can now conduct a counterfactual analysis of changes in the variables underlying $\tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}$ and $f_{ijt}$ as well as of changes in factor endowments, $L_{it}$, and the inverse of total factor productivity, $a_{it}$. The level of $a_{it}$ is hard to measure. However, defining real output as $\Upsilon_{it} = n_{it}\bar{y}_{it}$, with $\bar{y}_{it} = \sum_{j}^J x_{ijt}$, and aggregate tariff income of country $i$ in year $t$ as $\Xi_{it}$, and using these terms in the definition of nominal GDP, $Y_{it} = \sigma \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma - 1} w_{it} a_{it} \Upsilon_{it} = w_{it} L_{it} + \Xi_{it}$, we obtain

$$a_{it} = \frac{(1 - \sigma) L_{it}}{\sigma \Upsilon_{it}} \left( \frac{Y_{it}}{\Upsilon_{it} - \Xi_{it}} \right) .$$  \hspace{1cm} (33)

Now, the ratio of counterfactual to baseline inverse total factor productivity is

$$\frac{a_{it}^c}{a_{it}} = \frac{\Upsilon_{it}/L_{it}}{1 - \Xi_{it}/Y_{it} \Upsilon_{it}/L_{it}^c} \left( \frac{Y_{it}^c}{Y_{it}} - \Xi_{it}/Y_{it}^c \right) .$$  \hspace{1cm} (34)

Hence, while the level of $a_{it}$ is hard to measure, we can measure, for instance, the change of $a_{it}$ over time, $\frac{a_{it,t+1}}{a_{it}}$, by the inverse change in real output per worker, $\left( \frac{\Upsilon_{it}/L_{it}}{\Upsilon_{it,t+1}/L_{it,t+1}} \right)$ (using GDP at constant producer prices) from period
together with the change of the trade-weighted ad-valorem tariff factor, $\frac{1-\Xi_{it}}{\Xi_{it}}$.\footnote{In their model of the determinants of export variety, Feenstra and Kee (2008) allow total factor productivity to be determined endogenously in a non-linear systems estimation approach. While we do not consider heterogeneous firms or responses of total factor productivity to endogenous variables, this would be principally possible also with our general equilibrium model. One could even allow tariff indicators to be endogenous and analyze a system of equations where only geographical (distance and absence of a common land border) and cultural trade barriers (absence of a common language, of a past colonial relationship, or of a common colonizer) along with factor endowments $L_{it}$ would be exogenous. However this would push the importance of the adopted structural assumptions quite far, and we resort to stronger assumptions about exogeneity at the advantage of simplicity of an already complicated structural empirical general equilibrium model with path dependence at the extensive margin.}

Using $P_{it} \equiv m_{it}^{1/\theta_{it}} \theta_{it}^{1-\sigma}$, we use the equivalent variation as a measure of welfare change in percent (this is the change of real GDP in terms of consumer prices, $Y_{it}/P_{it}$, in percent) and calculate it as

$$EV_{it} \equiv 100 \cdot \left( \frac{Y_{it}^c/P_{it}^c}{Y_{it}/P_{it} - 1} \right).$$

(35)

In general, we calculate changes between baseline and counterfactual equilibria based on the estimates of Model B for each experiment.

5.2 Design of experiments

Recall that, by design of our data-set, $t = 0$ corresponds to the initial year of 1992, while $t = 1, ..., 4$ correspond to 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004. Hence, $V_{ij,t-1}$ refers to three years prior to the one referred to by $t$. For the analysis of the role of fundamental variables to the model on outcome, we will compute equilibria which are based on $\tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}$, $f_{ijt}$, $L_{it}$, $a_{it}$, and $V_{ij,t-1}$ as observed or estimated from data used for estimation. In general, we will use model
predictions based on such values and parameters for the observation period, namely the years 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, as benchmark equilibrium values. Using estimated parameters from the data and assuming an elasticity of substitution of $\sigma = 5.74$, we then consider four counterfactual equilibria for all countries and country pairs for those years. To some extent, such an analysis is related to an impulse-response analysis in empirical macroeconomics. The four experiments considered are the following:

**Freezing bilateral tariffs:** For this experiment, we change tariff-related trade costs as captured by the indicator variables for quintiles of tariffs in 1998, 2001, and 2004 so as to eliminate the experienced tariff change since 1995 from the data. This leads to counterfactual levels of $\tau_{ijt}^{c_{1}-\sigma}$ and $f_{ijt}^{c}$ which in turn determine the counterfactual export status $V_{c_{1},ij,t-1}$ for $t-1 = 2, 3$, leaving $L_{i,t}$ and $a_{it}$ for every year $t$ as observed in the data.

**Freezing labor endowments:** For this experiment, we set $L_{i,t}^{c}$ in each year after 1995 to the level $L_{i1}$, which corresponds to 1995. Inter alia, this leads to changes at the extensive margin so that $V_{c_{1},ij,t-1}^{c} \neq V_{ij,t-1}$ in $t-1 = 2, 3$. All other variables such as $\tau_{ijt}^{c_{1}-\sigma}$, $f_{ijt}$, and $a_{it}$ are as observed for any $ijt$.

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17We have derived all impulse-response results for three alternative levels of the elasticity of substitution, namely $\sigma \in \{5; 7; 10\}$. Since $\hat{\alpha}_{c} < 0$ and log ad-valorem tariff factors $\ln b_{c} > 0$ for all quintiles $\kappa = 2, ..., 5$, our results suggest that $\hat{\sigma} > 1$ throughout, which is consistent with the corresponding model assumption. However, there is variation about $\hat{\sigma}$ across $\kappa = 2, ..., 5$, as expected, and the corresponding point estimates are in the range of $\hat{\sigma} \in [4.36, 6.79]$. Since the number of observations in each of the upper four quintiles is about the same, the average value of $\hat{\sigma}$ is approximately 5.74. The latter seems plausible against the background of previous work at the aggregate level of bilateral trade (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003 or Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch, 2013). Hence, our estimates are broadly in line with the assumption of $\sigma = 5$. 34
Freezing total factor productivity: For this experiment, we set $a^c_{it}$ to its level of 1995 in every year after 1995 but let $\tau^{1-\sigma}_{ijt}$, $f_{ijt}$, and $L_{it}$ change as observed in the data for any $ijt$. Again, this will lead to a change in aggregate bilateral export status so that also $V^c_{ij,t-1} \neq V^c_{ij,t-1}$ in $t-1 = 2, 3$.

Freezing past export status: For this experiment, we keep $V^c_{ij,t-1}$ constant at its level in 1995. Hence, outcome may change only in response to contemporaneous changes in $\tau^{1-\sigma}_{ijt}$, $f_{ijt}$, $L_{it}$, and $a_{it}$ as observed in the data between 1995 and 2004 for any $ijt$, but these changes may not stimulate dynamic adjustment at the extensive country margin of trade.

For each experiment we calculate counterfactual bilateral export flows ($X^c_{ijt}$), GDP ($Y^c_{it}$), the terms $\mu^c_{it}$ and $m^c_{jt}$, endogenous export status ($V^c_{ijt}$), and equivalent variation ($EV^c_{it}$) as described in Appendix 4.

A comparison of the four counterfactuals analyzed with the benchmark equilibrium for 2004 addresses the role of observed changes in all fundamental variables involved in our model.

– Tables 4a and 4b –

Table 4a summarizes average differences between 2004 and 1995 of $\hat{\tau}^{1-\sigma}_{ijt}$ and $\hat{f}_{ijt}$ based on parameter estimates and data. All changes are expressed in percent of the corresponding levels in 2004. In particular $\hat{\tau}^{1-\sigma}_{ijt}$ and $\hat{f}_{ijt}$ reflect weighted changes of tariffs according to the associated tariff quintiles country pairs belong in. However, total bilateral fixed costs are composed not only of
\( \hat{f}_{ij,t} \) but also of \( e^{-\delta \hat{V}_{ij,t-1}} \) so that it is useful to report changes of \( \tau_{ij,t}^{1-\sigma} \) and \( \hat{f}_{ij,t} \) along with ones of \( e^{-\delta \hat{V}_{ij,t-1}} \) and \( e^{-\delta \hat{V}_{ij,t-1}} \hat{f}_{ij,t} \) in Table 4a. In general, we have grouped countries into four blocs – EFTA members as of 2004,\(^{18}\) EU members as of 2004,\(^{19}\) NAFTA members,\(^{20}\) and a Rest of the World which consists of the remaining 89 countries our estimates are based upon (see Appendix 2 for a detailed list). We report changes for average country pair within and across blocs of countries and, underneath those figures, standard deviations across countries and country pairs. This is done to illustrate that there is much variation both within and across blocs of countries in tariff-related impulses in variable and fixed trade costs. There are entries in the diagonal elements because these blocs consist of multiple countries.\(^{21}\)

Table 4a points to relatively large differences in variable and fixed trade costs between 2004 and 1995. At first glance, it seems surprising that these changes are not smaller for intra-EU relationships than for other blocs. However, we should bear in mind that we define the EU as of 2004 so that the figures in Table 4a account for the extensive liberalizations between the ten entrants to the Union in 2004 and the tariff liberalizations between the 15 incumbents and those entrants even prior to the Union’s enlargement (see

\(^{18}\)European Free Trade Agreement: Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.

\(^{19}\)European Union: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.

\(^{20}\)North American Free Trade Agreement: Canada, Mexico, and United States.

\(^{21}\)In principle, one could even analyze changes within countries. However, \( V_{ii,t-1} = 1 \) for all \( ii,t - 1 \), and tariffs do not change for intranational trade. That does not mean that there are no intranational responses to changes in foreign tariffs. Changes in intranational trade in response to bilateral variable or fixed trade costs are indirect responses to changes abroad. When comparing counterfactual with benchmark equilibria for nominal trade, we will report intranational and international responses of countries’ outcomes to changes in fundamentals separately.

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Egger and Larch, 2011). Negative figures in the upper left panel of Table 4a indicate that $\widehat{\tau}_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}$ was lower and, hence, trade costs were higher in 1995 than in 2004. For many cells in that panel, the corresponding differences were in the double digits in terms of 2004 levels of $\widehat{\tau}_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}$. In general, the variation of differences in $\widehat{\tau}_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}$ within the cells of the panel appears as big as the one across bloc-wise averages.

The upper right panel of Table 4a suggests that fixed costs $\widehat{f}_{ijt}$ of exporting to a new market were higher in 1995 than in 2004 within and between most country blocs on average. The average difference was smaller than the one in $\widehat{\tau}_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}$, though. However, the variance in that comparison is bigger within most cells than the one of averages across cells. Again, there was a relatively big change for intra-EU25 relationships over the observation period. The lower right panel of Table 4a suggests that average fixed bilateral market-entry costs declined more extensively due to dynamic market entry than they would have without it. To see this, compare the cells in the panel at the lower right with the corresponding ones at the upper right of Table 4a.

Table 4b summarizes average changes in $L_{it}$ and $a_{it}$ for country blocs. Since both $L_{it}$ and $a_{it}$ are unilateral, there is no need for a bloc-by-bloc decomposition of the corresponding changes, unlike in Table 4a. Within all country blocs, the labor force was smaller in 1995 than in 2004 and more labor input was required to produce one unit of output on average prior to 2004. Estimated changes in technology between the reference years were obviously much larger than ones in labor endowments over the considered decade. As in Table 4a, the standard deviation of changes is meant to provide information
about the variation of differences between benchmark and counterfactual values – i.e., of impulses within blocs at the end of the observation period.

Since there is large variation in the impulses across countries, country pairs, and blocs thereof, we will also report averages and standard deviations of outcome responses across blocs below. The latter will not only vary through the heterogeneity of changes but also through the heterogeneity of levels of these variables in 1995.

Of course, since the model at stake is highly nonlinear, the total change in predicted outcome is not linearly separable into the ones contributed by the four fundamental variables. However, the magnitudes of the responses of outcome to the associated changes will shed light on the relative importance of these changes, given the magnitudes of observed or estimated changes in $\hat{\tau}_{ijt} - \sigma$, $e^{\delta V_{ij,t-1}}$, $L_{it}$, $a_{it}$, and inertia at the extensive country margin of trade, $\hat{V}_{ij,t-1}$.

### 5.3 Counterfactual versus benchmark equilibria

In Tables 5-8, we summarize the associated responses to the accumulated shocks described in Tables 4a and 4b on outcomes of interest. In particular, such outcomes are nominal bilateral flows at the extensive as well as the intensive country margin, $X_{ijt}$ (see Table 5),\(^{22}\) nominal trade flows at the intensive country-pair margin only, i.e., $X_{ijt}$ at given $X_{ijt} > 0$ in both the

\(^{22}\)At the level of country pairs, $X_{ijt}$ may be zero in the benchmark equilibrium, the counterfactual equilibrium, in neither situation or under either circumstance. We avoid loosing observations which entailed a change at the extensive country-pair margin of trade by aggregating total exports up by country bloc and then computing percentage changes after aggregating. We do not report the standard deviation of changes within blocs in that case to avoid dropping zeros.
benchmark and the counterfactual equilibria (see Table 6), endogenous export status as a binary measure of the extensive country-pair margin of trade only, \( V_{ijt} \) (see Table 7), intra-national nominal sales, \( X_{it} \) (see Table 8), the equivalent variation, \( EV_{it} \) (see Table 8), and the number of firms active, \( n_{it} \) (see Table 8). We do so for an elasticity of substitution of \( \sigma = 5.74 \), which is consistent with the data. Akin to the change in \( \tau_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} \) and \( f_{ijt}, L_{it}, \) and \( a_{it} \), all counterfactual equilibria are expressed as percentage changes relative to the benchmark equilibrium as of 2004. However, notice that outcomes in 2004 are informed by and depend on the history since 1995 (and the one before that). For the counterfactual equilibrium in 2004, it matters not only that but also when changes in fundamentals and associated responses happen.

The figures in Table 5 suggest that, across the board, technological change and the changes in variable and fixed trade costs together were the most important drivers of aggregate nominal bilateral exports. There were significant impulses in variable and fixed trade costs and, consequently, sizable responses of intra-EU and EU-EFTA trade. Those accrued to the liberalization of tariffs with the entrants to the EU via-à-vis the EU incumbents as well as the EFTA countries and also other blocs. Notice that we compare counterfactuals with higher variable and fixed trade costs to a benchmark equilibrium path with lower such costs. Hence, the upper left panel of Table 5 should be interpreted as to illustrate that the experienced reduction in tariffs led to large positive responses of nominal bloc-wise trade until 2004. The table suggests that technological progress was relatively more important than trade

– Tables 5-8 –
and fixed cost changes. This is not to say that (ad-valorem and fixed) trade costs are less important than technology as such. It rather means that the blunt tariff liberalization impulse in an already relatively liberalized world as of 1995 did not cause further strong responses of trade flows. In other words, the lion’s share of tariff liberalizations occurred at times prior to our sample period – when information about applied tariffs was even scarcer than from 1995 onwards. Technological improvements appear to have had a much stronger impact at given liberalization than tariff changes did.\footnote{It may well be that trade itself was an important carrier to technological change, which lies beyond the possibilities of inference with the structure imposed here (see Feenstra and Kee, 2008, for evidence along those lines).}

In contrast to Table 5, Table 6 now focuses on changes at the intensive country margin so that $V_{ijt} = 1$ is required in both the benchmark and the counterfactual equilibrium path before aggregating trade flows and computing changes thereof per bloc. We do not only report average bloc-wise changes but also the standard deviation in responses across the country pairs behind each cell of the four panels in Table 6. Similar to changes in total aggregate trade in Table 5, where $V_{ijt}$ could have been zero in either the counterfactual or the benchmark equilibrium, the estimated change in total factor productivity between 1995 and 2004 appears to have had the largest effect on nominal trade among the considered experiments. On average, trade among previously trading economies within and across country blocs would have grown by more than 20 percent less during the observation period, if technology had stayed constant after 1995 (see Table 6). The corresponding effect was particularly large within the EU25 bloc where a large fraction of both the exporters and the importers experienced dramatic productivity
improvements.

The average country pair in the sample would have seen a growth of trade at the intensive country margin which would have been slower by more than 12 percent without the growth of the labor force over the same time span (see Table 6). Not surprisingly, that effect was largest among the 90 ROW countries in the sample, where $L_{it}$ changed the most according to Table 4b. The change in trade costs and fixed costs together exhibited an impact on the growth of nominal trade flows at the intensive margin which was not much less important than the one of the change of the labor force since 1995. The average country pair would have seen a growth in trade which would have been almost 6 percent slower than for the benchmark path between 1995 and 2004. Both the impulses and the responses were largest for EU-ROW, EFTA-ROW, and NAFTA-ROW trade. However, even the response of intra-EU25 trade was quite sizable. According to the lower right panel in Table 6, a lack of dynamic adjustment at the extensive country-pair margin and its associated impact on fixed costs alone would have led to 3.7 percent less of growth at the intensive country margin of trade than in the benchmark equilibrium. For that effect, it matters where and when changes in economic fundamentals such as variable and fixed trade costs, labor endowments, or technology occur.

A comparison of Tables 5 and 6 suggests where most of the changes at the extensive margin occurred. Table 7 considers this difference explicitly by focusing on changes in $V_{ijt}$ rather than the difference between Tables 5 and 6 as such. The latter is interesting, but it is even more so in combination with Table 7, since changes at the extensive country margin may be composed of
minor changes in the number of trading relationships but big jumps in values of trade or vice versa.\textsuperscript{24}

Table 7 indicates, as expected, that a change in neither of the fundamental factors considered had a big impact on the extensive country margin of trade within or across EFTA, EU, and NAFTA. This is not surprising, since most of the countries maintained bilateral trade relations in the benchmark equilibria, and even the sizable impulses in fundamentals were not big enough to change that much. However, some of the impulses were as big in the ROW bloc, within and with which most of the existing zero trade flows in aggregate bilateral trade matrices occurred in the data. The extensive binary country margin of trade increased on average by about 6 percentage points in the average three-year interval between 1995 and 2004, according to Table 2. This change was mostly due to changes of relationships with or of the ROW. According to the upper left panel of the table, that change was mainly induced by a reduction in trade and fixed market-entry costs. The growth of the labor force had a qualitatively similar but quantitatively less important effect. If anything, technology growth and market-entry dynamics cushioned the stimulus of variable and fixed trade costs as well as population growth on the extensive country margin of trade with the ROW.\textsuperscript{25}

Table 8 summarizes responses to the impulses in Tables 4a and 4b of three further outcomes: intra-national sales (or “trade”, $X_{it}$) for the average

\textsuperscript{24}This is also the case for other extensive margins of trade such as the extensive product margin analyzed in Feenstra and Kee (2008) or Kehoe and Ruhl (2013).

\textsuperscript{25}Recall that, due to the nonlinearity of the model, we may not simply add up the changes in the four panels to arrive at the total predicted change of $V_{ijt}$. The proposed structural model predicts both average levels and average changes well. This suggests that changes in variable and fixed trade costs interact with changes in the labor force in a way so that the joint impact is significantly larger than the sum of the individual impacts.
country in a bloc, the change in the number of firms active, and the equivalent variation, which corresponds to the differences in the change of real GDP between an unobserved counterfactual configuration of economic fundamentals and the predicted benchmark path.

The first panel in Table 8 pertains to nominal intra-national goods sales which is interesting to compare either to the diagonal or the row sum entries of the respective impulse-specific panels in Tables 5 or 6. Not surprisingly, changes in variable and fixed trade costs had a smaller impact on intra-national sales than on international trade. The reason is that such changes have direct effects only on transactions with foreign consumers. Hence, all the effects on nominal intra-national sales are indirect in scope. Notice also that responses differ qualitatively in our model (and also in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008) from models without adjustments at the extensive country margin of trade. The reason is that trade costs affect real aggregate output, real output of the average firm, as well as the number of firms active, here. This is fundamentally different from models in the vein of Krugman (1979), Anderson (1979), or Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) where aggregate real output is independent of (ad-valorem) trade costs. Partly for reasons of real effects of trade costs, average bloc-wise responses in intra-national sales tend to have the same sign as the responses of international sales (exports) in Tables 5 and 6. Moreover, effects on intranational sales are qualitatively

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26 Since domestic sales are never zero, it suffices to consider $X_{iit}$ without any distinction of the extensive and the intensive country margin, there.

27 The latter is an aggregate, single-sector counterpart to the multi-sector analysis in Broda and Weinstein (2006), Feenstra and Kee (2008), or Kehoe and Ruhl (2013). However, unlike there it is influenced by a dynamic process about fixed costs and market entry at the country margin consistent with general equilibrium in the proposed model.
similar to the ones on international trade, since effects on wages or mill prices affect either outcome in a similar way.

Had trade costs and fixed costs not declined, or the labor force, or technology, or the number of markets served per country not increased since 1995, then firm numbers would have grown slower (or even have declined) in response.\textsuperscript{28} In other words, the decline in trade and fixed costs and the expansion of the labor force, technological progress, and aggregate export-market entry have each in isolation contributed to faster growth of the number of firms in the average country. This can be seen from the second panel in Table 8. Among those, market entry dynamics and the growth of the labor force were very important for the average country and country bloc. In particular, export market entry at the extensive country margin and the associated depression of fixed market service costs contributed to much growth of firm numbers in both the ROW and the EU as of 2004. The stimuli on firm numbers were biggest in the ROW, NAFTA, and EFTA. Variable and fixed trade-cost reductions exhibited their biggest impact on the growth of firm numbers in the EU and ROW. Technological progress was of minor importance for the entry of firms or export-market entry but was obviously more important for output per firm (firm size).\textsuperscript{29}

The last panel of results in Table 8 suggests that reductions in variable and fixed trade costs since 1995 together had a relatively small welfare-enhancing

\textsuperscript{28}This is true on average with the model, estimates, and data at hand. Yet, the reduction in variable and fixed trade costs alone even triggered negative effects on intranational sales in the EU.

\textsuperscript{29}To see this, consider the relatively large effects of technological progress on welfare in Table 8 and nominal trade flows in Tables 5-6 and contrast them with its small impact on market entry in Table 7 and firm numbers in Table 8.
impact, irrespective of which country bloc we look at. However, there was a big variation about that magnitude among the 90 countries in the ROW. The figures in the other columns suggest that dynamic adjustment at the extensive country margin, growth of the labor force and, in particular, technology improvements entailed much bigger stimuli for the growth of trade than variable and fixed trade costs. Had technological progress taken place in isolation, the average economy would have grown slower by more than 18 percent (or roughly 1.8 percent per annum) over the covered decade. Dynamic adjustment at the extensive margin (which is associated with lower fixed costs) explains a welfare change of about one-tenth of that magnitude on average. The realized growth of the labor force appears to have been about one-third less important for trade than technological progress was. Notice that the welfare effects reported in Table 8 are accumulated effects which depend not only on the difference in fundamentals between 1995 and 2004 but also the spacing of the associated difference in time. Since responses take time to accumulate, simple inference about welfare effects in static models as suggested by Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) is not possible in a dynamic setting as this one.

5.4 Impulse-response functions for average welfare and the intensive margin of trade

In Tables 5-8, we summarized responses of outcome to shocks in fundamentals by considering only the year 2004 for the comparison of counterfactual and benchmark equilibria. In part, these responses consisted of accumulated con-
temporaneous responses and amplified effects through dynamic adjustment at the extensive margin. It is the purpose of this subsection to disentangle accumulated immediate (contemporaneous) responses from the amplification effect accruing to dynamic adjustment through path dependence at the extensive country margin of trade. By such an analysis, we aim at disentangling dynamic from static gains from trade.

– Figure 1 –

In Figure 1, we display changes in response to impulses on the four fundamental variables across the four years 1995, 1998, 2001, and 2004. For the sake of brevity, we consider responses of the average country or country pair in a period and over time. In general, one source of a dynamic pattern in responses is the time pattern of impulses, and the other one is sluggish adjustment of outcome, in particular, at the extensive margin of exports. We aim at disentangling the two by displaying the total response by a blue line and the immediate response without dynamics by a red line in the figure.

Figure 1 contains six panels: three of them pertain to a response in the equivalent variation (at the top; compare to the bottom panel of Table 8) and three to the intensive country margin of nominal bilateral exports (at the bottom; to be compared to Table 6). In a horizontal dimension, we report responses to alternative impulses: keeping variable and fixed trade costs (left), labor endowments (center), and labor input coefficients (labor productivity; right) constant at their levels of 1995 for all countries and country pairs. In all panels, we consider responses of outcome between 1995 to 2007 to changes in fundamentals between 1995 and 2004 (i.e., there is one
period outside of the sample period).

The six panels suggest that dynamic adjustment at the extensive country margin dampens the detrimental effects of shocks for the average country (with equivalent variation) or country pair (with nominal exports at the intensive country margin). At first glance, this seems surprising, since we see that there is a positive impact of lagged dependent market entry on the probability of entering in any period. However, notice that the without-dynamics loci are based on equilibria which do not consider adjustments of $V_{ij,t-1}$ across time but enforce immediate adjustment through resource and other general equilibrium constraints. Hence, $V_{ij,t}$ changes only due to contemporaneous impulses in economic fundamentals. Ceteris paribus, this reduces the propensity to enter a randomly drawn new market. However, a contemporaneous detrimental impulse of fundamentals on outcome is cushioned by sluggish adjustment of $V_{ij,t-1}$. Some markets would not be served in the absence of a fixed-cost-reducing effect of path-dependent $V_{ij,t-1}$. Therefore, negative shocks of fundamentals will always be moderated by the aggregate learning effect through $V_{ij,t-1}$ as an argument of bilateral time-specific fixed market-entry costs.

Moreover, Figure 1 illustrates that the biggest marginal responses happened at the beginning and the end of the sample period. The results for 2007 relative to 2004 suggest that path dependence at the extensive country margin triggers dynamic effects on outcomes such as welfare and nominal trade.
6 Conclusions

This paper formulates a structural general equilibrium model which involves adjustment dynamics at the extensive country margin of aggregate bilateral trade. We postulate that fixed costs of aggregate export-market entry depend on the earlier presence of exporters from the same country in that market. Otherwise, the model is a large-numbers monopolistic competition version of the framework of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) or Krugman (1979). All firms in a market are homogeneous, do not segment export markets with respect to pricing, use labor as the only input factor, and – within a country – exhibit the same productivity. While it would be straightforward to allow firms to be heterogeneous with regard to their total factor productivity (e.g., as in Melitz, 2003), previous work suggests that aggregate quantitative analysis can safely ignore such heterogeneity. Firms exhibit variable and fixed costs of serving a market, and profits are linearly separable across countries. Hence, firms may decide to stay out of a market if the associated profits do not cover the fixed costs of doing so without inducing direct effects on their activity in other markets.

Structural estimation of that model rests upon two pillars: a dynamic panel data discrete choice process for the extensive country margin of exports which is coupled stochastically and in terms of parameter restrictions with a panel data model for the intensive country margin of exports; and a nonlinear process associated with goods-market clearing (through multilateral trade resistance) which depends on the endogenous extensive country margin of trade. We estimate parametric and semi-parametric bivariate dy-
namic sample selection versions of that model.

The results can be summarized as follows. First, there is clear evidence of dynamic adjustment at the extensive margin of trade conditional on observable fundamentals of bilateral trade flows as suggested by the theoretical model. Second, the structural model points to differences in the relevance of four alternative drivers of bilateral trade: trade costs and fixed market entry costs; labor endowments; labor productivity; and market entry dynamics. The data suggest that, after 1995, changes in labor input coefficients and labor endowments were (much) more important drivers of both the extensive and the intensive margin of trade than contemporaneous trade and fixed cost changes. Part of the reason of this result are bigger impulses in labor productivity and endowments relative to changes in tariffs. However, there is a lot of variation in the responses across countries and country pairs which does not only accrue to the heterogeneity of impulses in the decade after 1995 but also to the heterogeneity of country size as well as trade costs and market entry costs.

The paper sheds light on sizable dynamic gains from trade. Without market entry dynamics – i.e., in the absence of dynamic gains to exporters from knowledge acquisition about foreign market entry – the model predicts that negative shocks to trade would induce larger time-specific and accumulated responses of levels of trade or real consumption, irrespective of whether the impulse is on contemporaneous trade and fixed market entry costs, labor endowments, or labor productivity. At the extensive margin of bilateral aggregate exports, market entry dynamics (e.g., knowledge acquisition about foreign markets) were almost as important as rising productivity on average.
for the time and country sample covered.
References


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Appendix 1. Details on the maximum likelihood estimation procedure

Following Raymond, Mohnen, Palm, and Schim van der Loeff (2007, 2010), the likelihood of country pair \( ij \) at period \( t \), starting in \( t = 1 \) and conditional on the regressors in \( w_{V,ijt} \) (including the initial conditions) and \( w_{X,ijt} \) is given by terms in (31)-(32). We integrate out the country-pair-specific random effects \( \eta_{V,ij} \) and \( \eta_{X,ij} \) using a two-step Gauss-Hermite quadrature, which is based on

\[
\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} e^{-z^2} f(z) dz \approx \sum_{m=1}^{M} w_m f(a_m),
\]

where, \( e^{-z^2} \) plays the role of the normal density and \( f(z) \) is any continuous function of \( z \). \( w_m \) and \( a_m \) are the weights and abscissas, respectively, as defined by the Hermite polynomial (see, e.g., Abramovitz and Stegun, 1964), where \( m \) indexes to the integration points of which there are \( M \).

Using the transformation of the random variables 
\[
z_{V,ij} = \frac{\eta_{V,ij} \sigma_{V,\eta}}{\sqrt{2(1-\rho_{\eta}^2)}} \quad \text{and} \quad z_{X,ij} = \frac{\eta_{X,ij} \sigma_{X,\eta}}{\sqrt{2(1-\rho_{\eta}^2)}}
\]

with the likelihood weights \( w_p \) and \( w_m \) and corresponding abscissas \( a_p \) and \( a_m \), we can approximate the likelihood function as

\[
L_{ijt} \approx \frac{\sqrt{(1-\rho_{\eta}^2)}}{\pi} \sum_{p=1}^{M} w_p \Pi_{t=1}^{T} \left( \frac{1}{\sigma_{X,\varepsilon}} \Phi \left( \ln X_{ijt} - B_{ijt} - a_p \sigma_{X,\varepsilon} \sqrt{2(1-\rho_{\eta}^2)} \right) \right)^{V_{ijt}}
\]

\[
\times \sum_{m=1}^{M} w_m \left( e^{2\rho_{\eta} a_p a_m} \Pi_{t=1}^{T} \left( \Phi \left( -A_{ijt} + a_m \sigma_{V,\eta} \sqrt{2(1-\rho_{\eta}^2)} \right) \right)^{1-V_{ijt}} \right)
\]

\[
\times \Phi \left( \frac{-A_{ijt} + a_m \sigma_{V,\eta} \sqrt{2(1-\rho_{\eta}^2)} + \rho_{\varepsilon} \sigma_{X,\varepsilon} \left( \ln X_{ijt} - B_{ijt} - a_p \sigma_{X,\varepsilon} \sqrt{2(1-\rho_{\eta}^2)} \right)}{\sqrt{(1-\rho_{\varepsilon}^2)}} \right).
\]

Note that the double integral in (31) is then approximated by a weighted
double summation over all abscissa points $a_p$ and $a_m$.

Appendix 2. List of included countries by continent


**Americas (33 countries):** Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.

**Asia (40 countries):** Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Georgia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Viet Nam, Yemen.
Europe (36 countries): Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium and Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (former Yugoslav Rep. of), Malta, Moldova (Rep. of), Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.

Pacific (9 countries): Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu.

Appendix 3. Imputation of tariffs and construction of tariff-quintile indicators

Table 9 summarizes the parameter estimates of the (log-)linear econometric model which we used to impute bilateral log tariff factors, \( \ln(1 + \text{tariff rate}_{ijt}) \). The estimated model includes, inter alia, \( \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^{J} \ln(1 + \text{tariff rate}_{ijt}) \) as a regressor. Usually, one would avoid doing so to prevent an endogeneity bias. However, since we are interested in imputation rather than causal analysis in Table 9, such a procedure is innocuous.

Notice that the models we employ in Table 3 are based on 57,120 observations for which we need tariff quintiles. Average (trade-weighted) applied bilateral tariff rates are non-missing for 42,537 observations. Hence, 14,583 (about one-quarter) of the bilateral log tariff factors have to be imputed. The regression in Table 9 is based on a larger number of data-points than the regressions in Table 3 are. This helps predicting tariff rates in the earlier
years of the sample period the export models are based upon. Some of the imputed observations use data before and after missing data-points, most of them are informed by non-missing bilateral tariffs in later years of the sample period. The imputation models work relatively well with a within $R^2$ of almost 40%.

We use the 57,120 observations on partly imputed bilateral log tariff factors, $\ln(1 + \text{tariff rate}_{ijt})$, and allot them into quintiles. Finally, we define five binary indicator variables capturing which quintile of $\ln(1 + \text{tariff rate}_{ijt})$ exports from $i$ to $j$ in year $t$ are associated with. The use of tariff quintiles rather than actually observed and imputed tariff rates helps reducing the measurement error (see Wansbeek and Meijer, 2000).

**Appendix 4. Solving the fully nonlinear model in counterfactual equilibrium**

Based on known (or estimated) parameters including $\sigma$, known counterfactual GDP shares $\theta_{ci}^c$ and $\tilde{\theta}_{ci}^c$, and counterfactual trade barriers $(\tau_{it}^{1-\sigma})^c$ and $f_{it}^c$ for each period, we may solve for counterfactual trade resistance terms from the system (18), using

$$V_{ij}^c = 1 \left[ \ln \left( \frac{\tau_{ijl}^{1-\sigma}}{\tau_{lit}^{1-\sigma}} \right) + \ln \frac{m_{ij}^c}{m_{it}^c} + \ln \frac{f_{ij}^c}{f_{ijl}^c} + \delta(V_{ij,t-1}^c - 1) \right], \quad (38)$$

where $\tau_{ijl}^{1-\sigma}$ and $f_{ijl}^c$ depend on the same variables capturing trade barriers by assumption. Of course, $\theta_{it}^c = Y_{it}^c / (\sum_{j=1}^J Y_{ij}^c)$ is not observed, but $Y_{it}^c$ it can
be solved for by using

$$Y_{it}^c = \frac{p_{iit} Y_{it}^c}{p_{it} Y_{it}} Y_{it} = \left( \frac{\mu_{iit} / n_{iit}}{\mu_{it} / n_{it}} \right)^{\frac{1}{n_{it}}} Y_{it}^c Y_{it}$$

$$= \left( \frac{\mu_{iit}^c}{\mu_{it}} \right)^{\frac{1}{n_{it}}} \left( \frac{\mu_{iit} / n_{iit}}{\mu_{it} / n_{it}} \right)^{\frac{1}{n_{it}}} \left( \frac{f_{e,t} + \sum_{j=1}^J V_{ijt} e^{-\delta V_{ij,t-1} f_{ij,t}}} {f_{e,t} + \sum_{j=1}^J V_{ijt} e^{-\delta V_{ij,t-1} f_{ij,t}}} \right) \frac{1}{a_{it} Y_{it}} Y_{it},$$

where we employed the expression for real GDP of country $i$ in year $t \ Y_{it} \equiv \frac{1}{n_{it}} L_{it}$ for the baseline scenario and an analogous definition for $Y_{it}^c$. Moreover, we insert $p_{it} = (\mu_{iit} / n_{iit})^{\frac{1}{n_{it}}}$ from (15) and assume throughout that $f_{iit}^c = f_{iit}$.

Lastly, we insert (10) to substitute $n_{it}$ and $n_{iit}$. Since $f_{e,t}$ is unobserved, one has to employ data on firm numbers, $n_{it}$, to estimate it from the labor constraint or one imposes an approximation assumption along the following lines

$$f_{e,t} + \sum_{j=1}^J V_{ijt} e^{-\delta V_{ij,t-1} f_{ij,t}} \approx \sum_{j=1}^J V_{ijt} e^{\delta V_{ij,t-1} f_{ij,t}}.$$  

The approximation error will be negligible, if $f_{e,t}$ is smaller than or similar to $f_{ij,t}$ or $f_{ij,t}^c$.  

For estimation, replace estimates of $V_{ijt}$ by ones of $V_{ijt}^c$ from (38) and $Y_{it}$ by $Y_{it}^c$ from (39) in (18). In particular, use $\hat{V}_{ijt}^c = 1[P(\ln \hat{V}_{ijt}^c > 0) >$

30To illustrate the approximation error, define $F_{it} = \left( \sum_{j=1}^J V_{ijt} e^{-\delta V_{ij,t-1} f_{ij,t}} \right) / \left( \sum_{j=1}^J V_{ijt} e^{\delta V_{ij,t-1} f_{ij,t}} \right)$ and $1 + g_{it} = F_{it}^c / F_{it}$. Then the approximation error is given by

$$1 + g_{it} = \frac{(1 + g_{it}) F_{it} + g_{it}}{F_{it} + g_{it}} = \frac{g_{it} + f_{ij,t}}{F_{it} + g_{it}}.$$  

If $F_{it} = J f_{e,t}$ and all trade flows are strictly positive, it amounts to $\frac{g_{it}}{F_{it}}$.

In order to check the assumption about the size of the approximation error, we used data on the number of manufacturing firms as published by the World Bank as the number of establishments in manufacturing (in the World Development Indicators). Employing data on $n_{it}$ in the factor market clearing condition (9), we may regress $\frac{\mu_{iit}}{\sigma_{n_{it}}}$ on a time fixed effect and $\sum_{j=1}^J V_{ijt} f_{ij,t} e^{-\delta V_{ij,t-1}}$. The parameters on the former are estimates of $f_{e,t}$ and the parameter on the latter is a scaling parameter. Inserting the estimate of $f_{e,t}$ for the last period of the data in equation (40) suggests that the approximation error amounts to 0.54% on average and to 0% at the median and within the interquartile range.
\[
\frac{1}{TN(N-1)} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{j=1}^{J} \sum_{i \neq j} P(\ln \tilde{V}_{ijt}^c > 0) \]

as an estimate for \( V_{ijt} \) in (38). Notice that (18) and (38)-(39) have to be solved simultaneously (or iteratively until convergence), since, in counterfactual equilibrium, (18) depends on (38) and (39) both of which are a function of the multilateral resistance terms in (18).

The counterfactual analysis requires the prediction of the exporter status at the country pair level \( (V_{ijt}) \) for both the baseline scenario and the counterfactual. For constructing a predicted binary indicator \( \hat{V}_{ijt} \) based on the continuous \( \tilde{V}_{ijt}^* \), we follow Fossati (2009) and minimize a cost-weighted misclassification cost function in a grid search to obtain these predictions:

\[
\hat{V}_{ijt} = 1 \text{ if } \Phi(\tilde{V}_{ijt}^*) > c_t^* \quad (41)
\]

\[
c_t^* = \arg\min_{c_t} \sum_{i=1}^{J} \sum_{j=1}^{J} (1 - q) V_{ijt} \left(1 - \hat{V}_{ijt}\right) + q (1 - V_{ijt}) \hat{V}_{ijt}, \quad (42)
\]

where the weights are given by \( q \in [0.535, 0.585, 0.620, 0.623] \) for periods 1995, 1998, 2001, and 2004, respectively. These weights are chosen to minimize the difference in the share of predicted versus observed non-zero exports.